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Abstract 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is commonly cited as the theoretical foundation for a range of 
specialized problem solving courts, including Mental Health Courts (MHCs). However, studies 
to date have failed to explicitly examine how MHCs apply the principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence. Moreover, an extensive review of the literature failed to locate a single-sourced 
consolidation of these principles (a “model”), which in turn, has imposed a barrier to the rigorous 
examination of how MHCs have applied the theory. To address both circumstances, the present 
study first conducted an extensive review of the literature to extract three overarching principles 
of therapeutic jurisprudence, including: 1) Therapeutic jurisprudence promotes supports and 
services in line with rehabilitation and reintegration; 2) Therapeutic jurisprudence promotes 
therapeutic rules and procedures over those considered anti-therapeutic; and 3) Therapeutic 
jurisprudence promotes therapeutic interactions over those considered anti-therapeutic. The 
researcher then reviewed the literature to extract indicators of how each principle is applied in a 
MHC setting. These principles and associated indicators were consolidated into a “MHC 
Model”. This Model serves as an original contribution to the literature, and is suitable for use as 
a rubric in examining how the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence have been applied.  
 
Guided by the MHC Model, the researcher then sought to determine how a specific MHC applies 
the identified principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. Data were collected through the 
researcher’s observation of the court and through interviews with ten subjects whose 
involvement covers the spectrum of services and functions provided by this MHC. Observations 
of the researcher and data obtained from respondents were compared to the MHC Model to 
establish the degree of consistency. 
 
The findings suggest that the court applied the first and second principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence in a manner that is weakly consistent with the literature. The court’s application of 
the third principle is essentially congruent with the literature, and is therefore considered highly 
consistent. These findings shed light on the reality that MHCs may face constraints beyond their 
control that prevent rigorous application of therapeutic jurisprudence principles in line with the 
ideal reflected in the literature. In light of these findings, the study has been able to develop 
recommendations for stronger alignment with the principles, which the court might consider 
adopting in order to improve its functioning and, potentially, outcomes. Further, this study 
highlights the need for future research to consider how MHCs might best apply the principles of 
therapeutic jurisprudence in less than ideal circumstances. 	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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Individuals diagnosed as mentally ill comprise 20-30% of the incarcerated 
population in Canada (Schneider, Bloom, & Heerema, 2007). For persons with mental 
illness (PMI), interactions with the criminal justice system are typically the consequence 
of minor offences, and often reflect the lack of adequate mental health and community 
services (Schizophrenia Society of Canada, 2005). If convicted, PMI are commonly 
placed into prison environments that lack the necessary treatment, support, or assistance 
they require to address their mental health needs (Schizophrenia Society of Canada, 
2005). Recognizing the inappropriateness of this response, ongoing debate considers how 
the criminal justice system could better respond to PMI who are in conflict with the law.  
Over the past two decades, the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence has had a 
notable impact on the legal system and its treatment of what are termed “vulnerable 
populations”. Initially developed in the 1980s, therapeutic jurisprudence entails the 
“study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent” (Wexler & Winick, 1996, p. xvii). 
The theory posits that various aspects of the law can result in positive (“therapeutic”), 
negative (“anti-therapeutic”), or neutral consequences (Steadman et al., 2001; Wexler & 
Winick, 1992). Recognizing these outcomes, therapeutic jurisprudence encourages courts 
to evaluate whether anti-therapeutic aspects can be replaced by more therapeutically 
aligned alternatives (Wexler & Winick, 1996). 
The perspective offered by therapeutic jurisprudence has become integrated into a 
variety of specialized courts in response to a range of social and health-related issues 
(Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007). In general, courts of this nature are community-
based programs that divert people facing criminal charges and substitute highly 
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structured and monitored therapeutic regimens (Pollock, 2009). In so doing, they afford 
accused persons the opportunity to access treatment and social support services in place 
of traditional criminal justice processes and dispositions (Pollock, 2009). Among these 
specialized courts, and the focus of this proposed study, are Mental Health Courts 
(MHCs).  
While there is little doubt that MHCs are inspired by the theory of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, the literature has thus far failed to explicitly examine how these courts 
apply the theory. Moreover, an extensive review of the literature failed to locate a single-
sourced enumeration of the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, which in turn, has 
impeded rigorous examination of how therapeutic jurisprudence is applied in MHCs. 
Rather, as the literature review will demonstrate, studies of MHCs typically confirm the 
application of therapeutic jurisprudence through the presence of “indicators” rather than a 
more fulsome compliance with principles on which the theory is founded. Indicators, in 
this context, refer to reflective elements of therapeutic jurisprudence that are found in 
MHCs. While valid, they are best considered as necessary, but not sufficient to establish 
congruence with the theory. Sufficiency would be attained by contrasting a given MHC 
with a consolidation of the literature that, in the ideal, identifies overarching principles of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and key indicators/elements of each. Used as a rubric, such a 
resource would differentiate between courts that have “some of the characteristics” and 
those having a “considerable or sufficient number of characteristics”. 
Without such a rubric, how MHCs apply the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence is 
not, and cannot be adequately answered. This circumstance is particularly problematic for 
studies measuring the impact of MHCs on rates of recidivism, where generalizability 
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requires the assumption that therapeutic jurisprudence is applied fully and consistently 
across MHCs.  
Statement of Purpose 
 
This study addresses these deficits in both the theoretical knowledge and the 
MHC literature, and is guided by two major research questions.         
(1) What are the core principles of therapeutic jurisprudence and the indicators of 
each? 
To answer this question, the researcher conducted an extensive review of the literature to 
extract and consolidate a) a list of the overarching principles of therapeutic jurisprudence 
and b) indicators of how each is applied in a MHC setting. This information was 
consolidated into the “MHC Model”, which is suitable for use as a rubric in examining 
how a given MHC has applied the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence.  
The second research question asks: (2) Does the application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles in the MHC under study reflect the MHC Model?                                                                                       
Sub-questions examine each of three overarching principles of therapeutic jurisprudence:   
2a) How does Mental Health Court promote therapeutic solutions?                                
2b) How does Mental Health Court apply therapeutic rules and procedures?                           
2c) How does Mental Health Court facilitate therapeutic interactions?                                
To answer these questions, the researcher conducted interviews with ten participants 
whose involvement in the MHC under study spans the range of functions and services 
germane to the court. Questions sought to determine how the court applies the principles 
of therapeutic jurisprudence. These interviews were supplemented by twenty-five hours 
of participant observation of the court in operation. The researcher then compared and 
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contrasted the codes generated from these interviews with the MHC Model to determine 
the degree consistency. Indicators were judged to be highly consistent when there was 
strong overlap between the data and the MHC Model; conversely, they were judged to be 
weakly consistent when there was little or no overlap between the data and the MHC 
Model.  
Significance 
 
This study has the potential to contribute to two underdeveloped areas of the 
literature on both MHCs and therapeutic jurisprudence. First and foremost, it develops a 
MHC Model as an original contribution to the literature, providing the first single-
sourced description of the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence and associated 
indicators of how these principles can be applied in a MHC setting. Further, the MHC 
Model is able to serve as a rubric by which other MHCs can be examined using similar 
methodology, and opens the door to comparative studies of how therapeutic 
jurisprudence is applied across MHCs. 
Second, this study is the first to explicitly assess how a MHC applies the 
principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. In particular, it uses the MHC Model to examine 
how the court under study applies these principles, and identifies specific areas of 
stronger and weaker alignment. In so doing, the study has been able to develop 
recommendations for stronger alignment with the principles, which the court might 
consider adopting in order to improve its functioning and, potentially, outcomes.  
Further, studies on MHCs generally take the form of systemic or outcome 
evaluations, typically measuring rates of recidivism compared to traditional criminal 
courts. Between-study comparisons are difficult, if not impossible, as there has been no 
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way to compare courts in terms of similarities and differences. Should future outcome 
studies incorporate the MHC Model and methodology introduced in the present study, 
there is the potential for comparability and generalizability to be enhanced. Comparative 
benchmarking of this nature would permit MHCs to identify areas of relative weakness 
and to plan for greater alignment with the principles upon which the theory of therapeutic 
jurisprudence is founded. 
Study Outline 
 
Chapter 2 of this study reviews the literature pertaining to both therapeutic 
jurisprudence and MHCs. At its conclusion, the review introduces a MHC Model that 
summarizes and consolidates three overarching principles, along with key indicators for 
each. Chapter 3 describes the methods and methodology for the study, and Chapter 4 
presents the findings. Chapter 5 includes a discussion of these findings, followed by the 
conclusions derived from the study and recommendations for future research. 	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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This literature review is divided into four sections. Part I examines the application 
of therapeutic jurisprudence and summarizes shortcomings identified in past research. In 
particular, studies tend to utilize therapeutic jurisprudence as a “source of guidance”, in 
that there is no standardized rubric applied to assessing the degree of fit with established 
principles. This limitation ultimately impedes the examination of how MHCs apply 
therapeutic jurisprudence in its entirety.  
In response to these gaps in knowledge, the remainder of this chapter focuses on 
the development of the consolidated MHC Model. In particular, Part II reviews the 
literature to establish overarching principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. Upon so doing, 
Part III presents a consolidated MHC Model, including the overriding principles and 
associated indicators as to how each is applied. Part IV elaborates this Model, detailing 
the identified indicators. Of note, the development of this Model was a necessary step in 
answering the second research question. In particular, interview questions sought to 
determine how the court applies the principles established by the MHC Model. In 
addition, the Model is later compared to the findings in order to identify areas of strong 
and weak consistency.  
Part I: Application of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 
Defining Therapeutic Jurisprudence  
 
The theoretical perspective of therapeutic jurisprudence, developed in the 1980s, 
is the “study of the role of the law as a therapeutic agent”, and is an “interdisciplinary 
enterprise designed to produce scholarship that is particularly useful for law reform” 
(Wexler & Winick, 1996, pp. xvii). Therapeutic jurisprudence recognizes that the law is 
	  	   7	  
not merely a series of standardized rules and regulations, but rather a social force that can 
also influence psychological and emotional well being (Wexler and Winick, 1996). In 
this regard, various aspects of the law can produce positive (deemed “therapeutic”), 
negative (“anti-therapeutic”), or neutral consequences (Steadman, Davidson, & Brown, 
2005; Wexler & Winick, 1991).1 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is commonly cited as the theoretical foundation for a 
range of specialized applications known as problem solving courts, including: drug 
treatment court, domestic violence court, reentry court (dealing with the reintegration of 
individuals on parole, such as sex offenders), dependency court (a branch of family court 
that addresses abuse and neglect), youth court, and MHC (see Hora & Stalcup, 2008; 
Winick, 2002, p. 1057-1058). Wexler (1995) states that the definition of “therapeutic” 
has traditionally been left vague to accommodate these differences. Insight as to what 
constitutes therapeutic practice is obtained from several research disciplines, including 
psychiatry, psychology, sociology, criminology, and social work (Wexler, 1999). In 
relation to each court, relevant research, to some extent, shapes how the central constructs 
of “therapeutic” and “anti-therapeutic” are defined (Wexler, 1999). The defining criterion 
is that any consequence that is arguably therapeutic would fall “within the broad 
contours of therapeutic jurisprudence” (Nolan, 2009, p. 186; Wexler, 1995). 
Application of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in MHCs  
 
MHCs are commonly cited as a direct application of problem-solving courts and 
therapeutic jurisprudence. However, a review of the literature yields only a modest 
number of studies that explore how therapeutic jurisprudence has been applied in MHCs. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 With respect to this study, “therapeutic” refers to anything that is beneficial to the individual’s mental 
health, or encourages rehabilitation and reintegration. Conversely, “anti-therapeutic” refers to anything 
that is harmful to the individual’s health or impedes their rehabilitation and reintegration.  
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Rather, the majority of the literature involves systemic or outcome evaluations, typically 
measuring rates of recidivism compared to traditional criminal courts (see for example 
Boothroyd et al., 2005; Christy et al., 2005; Hiday & Ray, 2010; McNeil & Binder, 2007; 
Moore & Hiday, 2006; Steadman & Naples, 2005).  
Typically, such outcome studies acknowledge a general alignment with 
therapeutic jurisprudence by referencing the theory as having influenced the MHCs under 
study. For example, Herinckx et al., (2005) suggest MHCs “operate as a problem-solving 
court under the philosophy of therapeutic jurisprudence” (p. 854). Redlich et al., (2005) 
examine two generations of MHCs, suggesting both are “based on the premise of 
therapeutic jurisprudence” (p. 532). Further, Boothroyd et al., (2003), suggests, 
“therapeutic jurisprudence has been influential as a philosophic basis for the creation of 
some if not all mental health courts” (p. 55). None, however, provide explicit definitions 
of what is meant by “therapeutic jurisprudence”. 
Other studies that acknowledge therapeutic jurisprudence as the basis do suggest 
that MHCs are guided by specific principles. For example,2 Wolff (2002) suggests MHCs 
“[embrace] the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence” (p.431), while Winick (2002) 
purports that MHCs “often use principles of therapeutic jurisprudence to enhance their 
functioning” (p. 1064). Further, Ray & Brooks Dollar (2013) suggests MHCs are “based 
on the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, which suggests that the law can have a 
positive psychological outcome for offenders when it is used to encourage meaningful 
and positive changes” (p. 649). However, such references are typically limited to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Further to the outlined examples, Leroux (2008) purports that MHCs “operate under the principles of 
therapeutic jurisprudence” (page 4). Moreover, Winick (2002) again acknowledges that “problem solving 
courts use principles of therapeutic jurisprudence to enhance their functioning” (p. 1064). Schneider 
Bloom & Hereema (2007) describe it as “a theory that is widely regarded as having roots in common 
sense” (p. 43). 
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sentence within the introductory passage, and consistently fail to elaborate or define the 
principles to which they allude.   
In summary, research that specifically addresses the application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence in MHCs invariably identifies significant shortcomings, typically in 
relation to the adoption of broad definitions and an unsystematic application of the 
theory. As such, these studies have been unable to provide clear explanations as to how 
MHCs have applied the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence.  
Indicators of Therapeutic Jurisprudence  
 
As mentioned, another way that MHCS tend to confirm the application of 
therapeutic jurisprudence is by identifying the presence of “indicators”. In this context, 
the term “indicators” encompasses any number of attributes that could potentially be 
considered therapeutic. For example, Petrucci (2002), Talesh (2007) and Wales, Hiday & 
Ray (2010) describe the importance of the judiciary in facilitating a therapeutic 
experience, and identify beneficial therapeutic “elements” that judges can incorporate 
into interactions, including: a) clear, understandable communication; b) involving the 
offender in the decision-making process; and c) demonstrating understanding, leniency, 
and sympathy whilst affording room for improvement and second chances. Wales, Hiday 
& Ray (2010) further identify the importance of d) “a heightened level of interpersonal 
treatment of participants that affords them dignity, respect and voice; e) accountability of 
participants and service providers alike; and f) transparency for decisions reached 
through an open negotiation process” (p. 265).  
These indicators, although valid, are best considered as necessary, but not 
sufficient to conclude that the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence has been adequately 
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applied. In other words, applying “some parts” of a theory is not the same as applying 
“enough parts” to meet the standard of sufficiency. Assessing sufficiency is better 
accomplished by consolidating the overarching principles of therapeutic jurisprudence 
and key indicators/elements for each. A resource of this nature would introduce a 
standard specifying the number and configuration of indicators that must be observed to 
confirm that therapeutic jurisprudence has been applied.  
Overall, the few studies that specifically address the application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence in MHCs identify significant shortcomings, including the use of broad 
definitions and the unsystematic application of the theory. Many studies tend to utilize 
the construct of therapeutic jurisprudence as a “source of guidance” (Casey & Rottman, 
2000, p. 446).  In others, the application of therapeutic jurisprudence is confirmed 
through the presence of reflective indicators, which are insufficient to confirm adequate 
application of the theory as they fail to meet the standard of sufficiency described. As a 
result, studies to date have been unable to present a complete assessment of the 
application of therapeutic jurisprudence. 
Part II: Establishing the Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
 
Despite the traditionally broad definitions and flexible application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence construct, developments in the literature have overwhelmingly 
concentrated on the theory in relation to mental health (Wexler, 1995). In reviewing these 
developments, the researcher sought to identify the underlying goal of therapeutic 
jurisprudence, as well as specific areas of the court to which the theory can be applied. 
Foremost, therapeutic jurisprudence describes how the law has the potential to 
heal through the improvement of health and psychological functioning, and recognizes 
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that underlying disorders can cause or contribute to criminal behaviour (Talesh, 2007; 
Wexler, 1995; 2000; Winnick, 1997). In so doing, therapeutic jurisprudence suggests the 
criminal process should focus on individual healing in place of categorizing, and 
punishing a group of offenders (Schneider, Bloom, & Heerema, 2007; Talesh, 2007). In 
line with these concepts, the literature consistently identifies the underlying goal of 
therapeutic jurisprudence as the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals involved in 
the criminal justice system (Hora, Schma & Rosenthal, 1999; Schneider, Bloom, & 
Hereema, 2007; Talesh, 2007; Wexler, 2000; Winick, 2002). 
The theoretical literature distinguishes two applied areas of the law. First, 
therapeutic jurisprudence can be used to examine the “structure” of the law and how rules 
and procedures impact the emotional and psychological wellbeing of PMI and their 
supporters (Boothroyd, Pythress, McGaha & Petrilla, 2003; Schneider, Bloom & 
Hereema, 2007; Wexler, 1995; 1999; 2000). To determine which roles and procedures 
are therapeutic, the theory encourages courts to consider “whether the process was 
sensitive to the individual characteristics of the accused; and whether the accused was 
treated fairly and with respect” (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007, p. 140). In so 
doing, therapeutic jurisprudence encourages courts to adopt therapeutic rules and 
procedures over those considered anti-therapeutic.  
In addition to rules and regulations, therapeutic jurisprudence examines the 
effects that may stem from interactions with various legal actors (Boothroyd, Poythress, 
McGaha & Petrila, 2003; Lurigio et al., 2000; Wexler, 2008; Winick, 2002). Here, legal 
actors are recognized as therapeutic agents who hold the potential to affect the mental 
health and psychological wellbeing of the people they encounter in the legal setting 
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(Watson et al., 2001;Wexler, 2000; 2008; Winick, 2002). In this sense, therapeutic 
interactions can facilitate participants’ successful participation in the courts, whereas 
anti-therapeutic interactions can adversely affect the participant’s compliance and 
subsequent success (Wexler, 2008). As such, therapeutic jurisprudence advises courts to 
“question whether each worker recognizes how his job can affect the therapeutic outcome 
and the process” (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007, p. 53). In so doing, it encourages 
actors to adopt interactions aligned with positive outcomes over ones considered anti-
therapeutic. 
In summary, with respect to MHCs:  
1) Therapeutic jurisprudence promotes supports and services in line with 
rehabilitation and reintegration; 
2) Therapeutic jurisprudence promotes therapeutic rules and procedures over those 
considered anti-therapeutic; 
3) Therapeutic jurisprudence promotes therapeutic interactions over those 
considered anti-therapeutic.  
Part III: MHC Model 
 
Table 1 summarizes the three overarching principles of therapeutic jurisprudence 
and associated indicators of how each is applied in a MHC setting. The proceeding 
discussion will elaborate this table and discuss each of the outlined indicators as extracted 
from the literature.  
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Table 1: Mental Health Court Model 
PRINCIPLES  INDICATORS OF PRINCIPLES 
1) Goals a) Balancing rights with care  
b) Consideration of Mitigating Factors 
c) Collaboration with Community Resources 
d) Monitored Progress 
 2) Rules a) Voluntary Participation 
b) Teamwork Approach 
c) Relaxed Rules/Procedures 
d) Assistance throughout Court Process 
e) Participant Inclusion 
f) Family/Caregiver Inclusion  
3) Interactions a) Therapeutically Enhanced Roles  
b) Verbal/Non-Verbal Communication 
 
This Model represents an original contribution, as it is the first single-sourced 
consolidation of literature to date, and is suitable for use as a rubric in examining how a 
given MHC has applied the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. Further, specific to 
the remainder of this study, the development of the MHC Model was a necessary step in 
answering the second research question. In particular, interview questions sought to 
determine how the court applies the principles established by the MHC Model. In 
addition, the Model is later compared to the findings in order to identify areas of strong 
and weak alignment.  
Part IV: Indicators of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles 
 
 As discussed, the application of therapeutic jurisprudence in MHCs is typically 
confirmed by the presence of “indicators”, rather than by examining the full and rigorous 
implementation of established principles. Here, the term “indicator” broadly refers to 
elements of MHCs that could be considered therapeutic under a traditionally broad 
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conception of the theory. Additionally, the literature offers various prescriptions as to 
how MHCs can adopt therapeutically aligned aspects of the law. These prescriptions 
commonly incorporate findings from disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, 
sociology, and social work. Although valid, these prescriptions and indicators are best 
considered necessary conditions, and are not sufficient to determine whether the theory of 
therapeutic jurisprudence had been satisfactorily applied. This section seeks to address 
these deficiencies by extracting and consolidating the various indicators and prescriptions 
from the literature, each of which is located under the appropriate principle of therapeutic 
jurisprudence. 
Principle 1: Outcomes Geared to Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
 
Indicator 1A) Balanced Response to Crime.  
In order to achieve rehabilitation and reintegration outcomes, the literature 
acknowledges the need for MHCs to provide a “balanced” response to the crime (Redlich 
et al., 2005; Rottman & Casey, 2000; Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007).3  In this 
sense, an appropriate response to crime includes considerations to denounce criminal 
conduct, deter other offenders from committing similar offences, and to protect the 
community for future harm (Rottman & Casey, 2000; Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 
2007). Upon satisfying these conditions, MHCs are met with a challenge to further 
incorporate a caring and effective response to the participant’s underlying disorder and 
associated needs (Rottman & Casey, 2000).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 With respect to MHCs, R. v. C.A.M., (1996) suggests: “The determination of a just and appropriate 
sentence is a delicate art which attempts to balance carefully the societal goals of sentencing against the 
moral blameworthiness of the offender and the circumstances of the offence, while at all times taking into 
account the needs and current conditions in the community” (As cited in Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 
2007, p. 99). 
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According to the literature, traditional responses to crime emphasize the need for 
justice, deterrence, and the protection of society (Lamb, Weinberger, & Gross, 2004; 
Rottman & Casey, 2000).4 However, they fail to consider the treatment, support, and 
assistance PMI require to address their mental health needs (Schizophrenia Society of 
Canada, 2009). As such, the MHC literature characterizes traditional responses as futile, 
insofar as punishment in and of itself is “ineffective as a deterrent when the behavior is 
rooted in psychiatric disorder” (Wolff, 2002, p. 432). Rather, such responses can 
perpetuate PMIs’ involvement in a revolving door process, whereby “the ‘hard-to-serve’ 
elements of the population continue to find themselves in conflict with the law” (Cosden 
et al., 2003; MacDonald et al., 2014, p. 8).  
In recognition of these shortcomings, MHCs use traditional sanctions sparingly.5  
Instead, where possible,6 responses seek to effectively balance these considerations. In 
particular, MHCs offer alternatives7 that incorporate restorative or remedial measures, 
using “sanctions and rewards to promote prosocial behaviours and positive change” 
(Goldberg, 2011, p. 9). Such responses satisfy this balance by responding to the crime in 
ways likely to be effective while addressing the offender’s underlying disorders.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The Criminal Code of Canada outlines codified responses to crime, with the intention to: denounce 
unlawful conduct; deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; separate offenders 
from society, where necessary (…) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; 
and to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders (1985, s.718).  
5  Redlich et al. (2005) examined the characteristics of eight MHCs, and found that seven reported using 
traditional sanctions such as jail “rarely and conditionally”, while the eighth utilized such responses 
“liberally” (p. 529). 
6  Some MHCs deal with more serious offenses that warrant mandatory sentencing, thereby eliminating the 
MHC’s latitude to consider such alternatives. Also, some MHC dispositions do not engage participants in 
treatment, such as peace bonds and absolute discharges (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007).  
7  For example, the literature suggests MHCs routinely utilize diversion programs, which “redirect 
individuals from the criminal justice and correctional systems to appropriate mental health-care services 
and correctional supports where possible” (Goldberg, 2011; Lamb, Weinberger, & Gross, 2004; 
Schneider, Bloom, & Hereema, 2007, p. 69; Talesh, 2007). Progress for the diverted person is 
periodically reviewed, and praised or sanctioned accordingly (see Section 1d).  
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Indicator 1B) Consideration of Mitigating Factors.  
To effectively respond to participants’ needs, MHCs “generate the need for new 
kinds of information not typically collected by courts” (Winick, 2002, p. 1060). In 
particular, MHCs seek to identify mitigating factors that can potentially thwart successful 
rehabilitation and reintegration8 (Redlich et al., 2005; Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 
2007; Wolff, 2002). Examples of mitigating factors include the nature of the participant’s 
underlying disorder, the person’s level of comprehension, and the person’s housing and 
employment status. Addressing these factors introduces the potential to enhance 
participant’s ability to achieve success. 
A core premise of MHCs is that underlying disorders are often the cause of, or a 
major contributor to, the participant’s criminal behaviour (Talesh, 2007; Wolff, 2002). 
Accordingly, in effectively addressing them, MHCs seek to identify “the severity and 
type of mental disorder, age, and presence or absence of mental retardation” (Redlich, 
2005, p. 606). The courts may further inquire about concurrent disorders such as 
substance abuse, which is “the most common and clinically significant comorbid disorder 
among adults with severe mental illness” (Drake et al., 2001, p. 469). To obtain this 
information, MHCs rely on psychiatric evaluations—typically conducted by court-
designated psychiatrists (Redlich, 2005; Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007). 
Understanding all dimensions of the disorder allows MHCs to consider supports and 
treatment responses based on need and “not correlated with the seriousness of the 
offence” (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007, p. 176). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Wolf (2002) suggests that judges consider these factors when setting sentences, referred to as 
“therapeutically informed sentencing” (p. 435).  
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In addition, MHCs seek to acknowledge participants’ varying levels of 
comprehension, and tailor interactions accordingly. This accommodation reflects that 
mental disorders are often characterized by “deficits in attention, cognition, and other 
executive functions that contribute to comprehension generally and are likely to 
contribute to MHC comprehension specifically” (Redlich, 2005, p. 611). In particular, 
reduced comprehension can result in difficulty understanding, and thus adhering to, court 
dispositions (Redlich, 2005).9 Recognizing this potential impediment, MHCs endeavour 
to present information in a way that is tailored to each participant’s level of 
comprehension, thereby increasing their ability to understand and fulfill court orders 
(Redlich, 2005).10   
As mentioned above, the research indicates that PMI are frequently homeless and 
unemployed11 (see, for example Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007; Lamb, Weinberger 
& Gross, 2004; MacDonald et al., 2014; Sullivan, Burnam, & Koegel, 2000). These 
impediments are particularly significant to MHCs, as “without adequate attention paid to 
the contributory effect of social disadvantage, there is a danger of a ‘revolving door’ 
between correctional, welfare and mental health systems” (Sheldon et al., 2006, p. 255). 
Unstable living conditions can serve as barriers to clinical progress in addressing mental 
and psychological conditions (Macdonald et al., 2014). Equally important, they are 
recognized as predictors of further criminal activity. For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Redlich (2005) further recognizes that the failure of legal actors to instruct clients in a comprehensible 
manner is a common cause for participant non-compliance. 
10 In particular, MHCs tailor the specific language used in court orders. This is further examined in section 
3b, “Verbal and Non-Verbal Communication”.   
11 An Ontario study evaluated the complex association between legal involvement and mental illness, and 
found that about one in five consumers of formal community mental health programs had at least some 
contact with the legal system during the research year, and that unstable housing was predictive of legal 
involvement (Sheldon et al., 2006, p. 249). 
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The stress of being homeless, the overwhelming mental health needs in the 
face of a deficit of resources and diminished coping abilities may 
exacerbate previous mental health challenges and worsen illness which too 
frequently make situations ripe for criminal involvement (MacDonald et 
al., 2014, p. 12). 
 
In response, MHCs seek to address participants’ housing an employment by connecting 
them with resources for job training, supported living, and housing outreach (Heilbrun & 
Griffin, 1998; MacDonald et al., 2014). This process of connecting individuals to 
resources is further explored below. 
Indicator 1C) Collaboration with Community Resources.  
The success of MHCs is ultimately “predicted by the strength of the essential 
services found in the community” (Watson et al., 2001, p. 481). MHCs must work closely 
with existing community based services and supports to address underlying disorders and 
factors that might impede success (Watson et al., 2001). Therefore, “in its ideal form, a 
mental health court is driven and coordinated by community resources, mental health 
services, public sentiment, and a criminal court system all working together” (Talesh, 
2007, p. 112).  
Participants can be linked to services and programs in a number of ways. The 
literature suggests that the most common method of achieving such links is through the 
use of diversion  (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007). Alternatively, those who do not 
qualify or wish to participate in diversion can be assigned a service coordinator or social 
workers that connects PMI with appropriate supports (Winick, 2002). Participants that 
are particularly difficult to locate (such as homeless individuals) can be reached through 
assertive community treatment (ACT) (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007).12 Finally, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 ACT provides “intensive treatment, rehabilitation and support services for individuals with serious 
mental illness and complex needs who find it difficult to engage in other mental health 
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some MHCs have the ability to mandate community mental health treatment13 (Redlich et 
al., 2005).  
Although available services and programs vary with each court location, 
modalities typically include: day treatment programs, counselling services, psychiatric 
and psychological treatment, community health services, and outpatient programs 
(Frailing, 2010; Rottman & Casey, 2000; Schneider, 2010; Talesh, 2007; Watson et al., 
2001). With respect to reintegration, supports are available to assist participants with 
obtaining identification papers, social assistance, clothing, and medication (Schneider, 
Bloom & Hereema, 2007, p. 176). Finally, as previously mentioned, participants can be 
connected with substance abuse treatment and assistance with housing and employment 
(Frailing, 2010; Rottman & Casey, 2000; Schneider, 2008; Talesh, 2007; Watson et al., 
2001). 
Indicator 1D) Monitoring/Supervision of Participants.  
When MHCs engage participants in support or treatment services, it is advisable 
that a monitoring component be included to increase the likelihood of compliance 
(Redlich et al., 2005; Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007; Talesh, 2007; Winick, 2002; 
Wolff, 2002). The research commonly contemplates a diversion model in which 
participants are required to attend periodic judicial status review hearings where 
treatment plans and other conditions are reviewed for appropriateness and compliance 
(Redlich et al., 2010). In addition, the court may offer incentives to reward adherence to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
services” (Canadian Mental Health Association, 2015). ACT team members often meet clients daily in 
their community (e.g., their home or a coffee shop) (Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, 2015).  
13 For example, MHCs may impose probation with a condition of mandatory outpatient treatment, known 
as a “conditional release”. They may also ask participants to agree to probation terms to engage in 
treatment, take prescribed medications, and adhere to other conditions of the court or treatment system 
(Redlich et al., 2005).  
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conditions, and impose sanctions for non-compliance14 (Redlich et al., 2010). As 
required, such reviews can occur weekly, biweekly, monthly, or quarterly (Redlich et al., 
2010).  
In theory, the purpose of monitoring is to motivate participants to comply with 
their assigned regimen. Redlich et al., (2010) conclude: “If MHC participants are 
required to keep in frequent contact with the judge, their caseworkers, and community 
treatment staff (who communicate with the court) by attending status review hearings, 
they will be less likely to relapse and discontinue treatment” (p. 272). Further, this 
monitoring process allows the courts to identify areas of weakness and non-compliance, 
and tailor regimens to better suit the participant’s level of comprehension and ability to 
comply (Redlich et al., 2005). Finally, Goldberg (2011), adds that “such reviews 
demonstrate to defendants and litigants that the court watches and cares about their 
behaviour, while providing ongoing opportunities for the court to communicate with 
litigants and defendants, and respond to their concerns and circumstances” (p. 23).   
Principle 2: Promotes Therapeutic Rules and Regulations 
 
Indicator 2A) Voluntary Participation.  
Participation in MHC must be voluntary (Herinckx, et al., 2005; Ray & Brooks 
Dollar, 2013; Redlich, 2005; Redlich et al., 2005; Schneider, 2008; Talesh, 2007; Watson 
et al., 2001; Winick, 2002). Eligible15 participants are presented with a choice to 
participate, or to proceed with traditional court adjudication (Herinckx, et al., 2005; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Participants who adhere to treatment programs for their duration generally have their cases dismissed, or 
sentences significantly reduced. Participants who do not comply or finish the program may have their 
case return to the traditional court adjudication (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007). 
 
15 Eligibility varies amongst MHCs, whereby, “different courts have different (or multiple) entry points to 
the criminal prosecution process and different entrance requirements” (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 
2007, p. 3).  
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Watson et al., 2001), and are permitted to withdraw from MHC and return to the 
traditional court adjudication at any point without penalty (Ray & Brooks Dollar, 2013; 
Schneider, 2010; Watson et al., 2001).  
Voluntary participation is an essential component of the MHC for two reasons. 
First, it is arguable that enforced treatment in Canada would violate participants’ civil 
liberties, and result in foreseeable challenges under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (see Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007, p. 87). Second, prior research 
unambiguously establishes the therapeutic value of choice – that active participation and 
adherence to treatment regimens are more likely when engaged through choice rather 
than coercion (Casey & Rottman, 2000; Redlich, 2005; Schneider, 2010). Thus, success 
ultimately rests on the participant’s desire and willingness to engage, and inclinations 
toward coercion must be viewed as futile.  
Indicator 2B) Teamwork.  
MHCs commonly adopt a “multidisciplinary team approach”, which involves the 
various court actors16 (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007; Ray & Brooks Dollar, 2013; 
Redlich et al., 2005; Talesh, 2007; Winick, 2002). The roles of MHC actors are described 
as “less adversarial as in traditional court, with an emphasis on enabling the defendant to 
gain access to treatment and other supports” (Boothroyd et al., 2003, p. 56). Aligned with 
this common goal, MHC actors collaborate throughout the court process to share and 
discuss their knowledge regarding the accused, their underlying disorders, details 
surrounding the offense, and potential impediments to success (Boothroyd et al., 2003; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Legal actors involved in the team process include: the judiciary, the Crown attorney’s office, duty 
counsel, defence bar, a case manager and other providers, mental health specialists, forensic psychiatrists, 
bail program personnel, and the designated hospital, if applicable (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007; 
Ray & Brooks Dollar, 2013; Redlich et al., 2005; Talesh, 2007; Winick, 2002).  
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Goldberg, 2011; Lamb, Weinberger, & Gross, 2000). Collaboration allows MHCs to 
tailor informed and best-fitting responses to the offense (Boothroyd et al., 2003; 
Goldberg, 2011).  
Indicator 2C) Relaxed Courtroom Environments.  
The literature emphasizes that MHCs relax traditional courtroom rules and 
procedures (Boothroyd et al., 2003; Goldberg, 2011; Redlich, 2005). In so doing, they 
endeavour to accommodate participants’ unique needs and eliminate these elements of 
the court that might intimidate individuals from attending or participating in the court 
(Barron, Hassiotis, & Banes, 2004). As stated by Goldberg (2011), the “rules of evidence, 
procedure, and courtroom etiquette are often relaxed to facilitate the participation of the 
mentally ill offender” (p. 10). 
The literature describes interactions within MHCs as informal (Redlich et al., 
2005). For example, Boothroyd et al., (2003), suggest that speaking order is not 
controlled in the MHC and, unlike traditional criminal courts, individuals are not 
reprimanded for speaking out of turn. As a result, there are often private conversations 
between defendants and other court participants, including the public defender or mental 
health consultants (Boothroyd et al., 2003). Further, defense attorneys are able to take 
their clients out of the courtroom to discuss matters in a calmer setting (Shoaf, 2004). 
In addition, MHCs are more relaxed with respect to non-adherence, recidivism, 
and failures to appear before the court (Redlich, 2005; Schneider, 2010). This exemplifies 
that MHCs recognize a number factors that can interfere with participants’ ability to 
comply with court orders. Further, the courts recognize relapse as a normal and expected 
occurrence in rehabilitation. In acknowledgment of these factors, MHC expectations are 
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relaxed, and sanctions are generally not imposed for relapse and recidivism17 (Redlich, 
2005; Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007). Finally, MHCs grant greater leniency with 
respect to court attendance, recognizing that PMI face obstacles that are likely to 
compromise their ability to both remember court dates and obtain transportation to them 
(Redlich, 2005).  
Indicator 2D) Assistance throughout MHC Process.  
The literature recognizes the criminal justice system as particularly complex and 
overwhelming for PMI (Wolff, 2002). In response, MHCs align participants with 
individuals who serve as court supports, and who guide and assist individuals throughout 
the court process (Schneider, 2008; Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007; Wolff, 2002). 
Support providers can take the form of court coordinators, support coordinators, or 
community-based case managers, and assignment generally occurs at the initial stages of 
booking or arraignment, where accused individuals are first identified with a mental 
illness (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007; Wolff, 2002).  
At the outset, court support providers give participants an overview of the 
“criminal process, charges, and options” (Wolff, 2002, p. 433). In addition, they guide 
participants through court procedural stages, including: bail hearings, the assessment of 
fitness, treatment orders, disposition hearings, guilty pleas, sentencing and diversion 
(Schneider, 2008; Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007). Assigned support providers can 
help PMI understand the outlined stages of the court, familiarize them with proceedings 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 For example, according to Schneider, Bloom & Hereema (2007), “non-compliance with a diversion 
program should not attract criminal sanctions” and, rather, should be first met with “further reassurance 
and support” (p. 230).  
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and court etiquette, and prepare them for occasions where their participation is required18 
(Goldberg, 2011). Also, facilitative assistance is commonly extended to the family 
members, whereby designated support providers will “liaise and meet with family 
members of mentally disordered accused to educate them about the necessary process 
their family member is about to undergo, as well as to help them assist their family 
member in executing the plan” (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007, p. 177). 
Indicator 2E) Inclusion of the Accused.  
MHCs incorporate the accused individual’s input throughout the decision making 
process (Cosden et al., 2003; Goldberg, 2011; Ray & Brooks Dollar, 2013; Winick, 
2000). In so doing, courts “encourage the individual's active involvement in both the 
negotiation and design of the rehabilitative plan, providing as great a degree of choice 
concerning the details as is possible in the circumstances” (Winick, 2002, p. 1084). 
Participants are thereby granted a platform to express their wants and needs, and to 
actively negotiate dispositions in line with their current circumstances (Goldberg, 2011; 
Winick, 2002).  
As a result, involving the accused has the potential to enhance their motivation to 
succeed19, as it grants “‘a sense of ‘voice’ (the ability to tell their story), and ‘validation’ 
(the feeling that what they have said has been taken seriously by the judge or hearing 
officer)” (Goldberg, 2011; Wexler, 2002, p. 1086). This, in turn, fosters a sense of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For example, Paradine (2000) suggests court support providers can engage participants in role-plays for 
the various stages of the court, including direct questions to prepare participants for court interactions.  
19 Goldberg (2011) states “direct engagement enables judges to motivate and influence defendants to make 
progress in treatment” (p. 23). In particular, “when judges speak directly to court participants – and, in 
turn, listen to them – they can inspire trust, motivate change, give participants a sense of voice and 
dignity, enhance progress and healing, and make court procedures more relevant to participants’ lives” 
(Goldberg, 2011, p. 29).  
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inclusion, whereby participants feel they have contributed to the outcome, and are 
therefore more likely to see it as fair (Winnick, 2002). Even when they do not necessarily 
agree with court orders, Winick (2002) suggests that this sense of inclusion increases 
participants’ willingness to comply. 
Indicator 2F) Inclusion of Support Systems.  
Where possible and appropriate, MHCs strive to include the participant’s support 
system, including family and caregivers, throughout the court process (Schneider, 2008; 
Wexler, 1993). For example, support systems are often afforded input throughout the 
decision making process, where they are invited to share and discuss their knowledge of 
the accused in that “…their input, concerns and needs are a key to understanding the 
candidates history and current needs” (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 
2000). These support systems tend to be particularly knowledgeable about information 
that can be difficult to retrieve, such as the participant’s medical history and living 
conditions (Goldberg, 2011; National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2000). 
Beyond having input, the presence of support systems can improve participants’ 
commitment to, and fulfillment of, court orders. For example, Winick (2002) suggests 
that support persons “should be included in the process during which the individual 
makes a commitment to participate in treatment, and that commitment should be made in 
a formal and relatively public way” (p. 1084). Moreover, Wexler (1993) suggests that 
public commitment leads to greater adherence than does private commitment. In theory, 
public adherence motivates individuals due to anticipated self-disapproval, as well as the 
anticipated disapproval of their family and caregivers (Wexler, 1993). Thus, insofar as 
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patients can be encouraged to inform one or more people of their intentions to follow the 
treatment regimen, an increased likelihood of adherence is proposed. 
Principle 3: Therapeutic Interactions  
 
Indicator 3A) Therapeutically Enhanced Roles.  
In describing the important role of legal actors in facilitating a therapeutic 
experience, the MHC literature outlines a number of characteristics that enhance 
therapeutic interactions with PMI. First, they must appreciate that participants often 
experience emotional difficulties, including “pain, shame, sadness, and anxiety in coming 
to terms with the existence of psychological or behavioral problems that have produced 
criminality and the victimization of others” (Winick, 2002, p. 1068). Actors should 
acknowledge these adversities, and respond in ways that convey empathy and 
compassion (Goldberg, 2011; Talesh, 2007). In particular, Goldberg (2011) further 
suggests that actors should: ask participants questions that indicate an interest in their 
position; relate events to participants’ lives; acknowledge not only the facts of a case, but 
people’s emotional responses to cases or court events; and convey a sense of personal 
care for the participant. Winick (2002) adds that MHC judges should “convey both an 
intellectual response to the individual, communicating that she understands the 
individual's predicament, and an emotional response, communicating that she shares the 
individual's feelings” (p. 1069).  
Second, actors should demonstrate encouragement and support for MHC 
participants which, in turn, can “spark the motivation of the individual to achieve 
rehabilitation and to increase compliance with treatment” (Winnick, 2002, p. 1090). In 
this regard, verbal praise and applause are common and effective strategies for 
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demonstrating support and encouragement of court participants (Goldberg, 2011; Winick, 
2002). In addition, MHC judges will congratulate participants at status review hearings 
for accomplishments, such as “going to scheduled clinic appointments and maintaining 
the components of their treatment plans” (Redlich, 2005, p. 607). Judges provide 
complementary support, focusing on a participant’s future potential rather than past 
behaviours (Goldberg, 2011, Winnick, 2002).  
Third, respect is a critical component of interaction that ultimately increases 
effective communication in the MHC. Goldberg (2011) describes this as a dynamic, 
whereby:  
A judge’s respect for a defendant can in turn generate that defendant’s 
respect for the judge and courtroom. This mutual respect can be the 
foundation on which to create a judge-defendant relationship that in turn 
can positively influence a defendant’s progress and outcomes (Goldberg, 
2011, p. 34). 
 
In support of this dynamic, MHCs strive to treat participants consistently and fairly, 
requiring legal actors to acknowledge and set aside their personal biases and 
predetermined ideas (Goldberg, 2011). Further, MHC actors endeavour to refrain from 
rushing or interrupting participant input, or otherwise diminishing the importance of their 
contributions (Goldberg, 2011). For example, judges will stop speaking “at appropriate 
intervals… signaling to the individual that what she has to say is important” (Winick, 
2002, p. 1071). 
Finally, MHC actors are encouraged to increase their “approachability” (Wexler, 
2000; Winick, 2002). Mental illness is frequently coupled with anxiety, which can make 
the already intimidating legal system more daunting (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 
2007). In addition to the challenges posed by their illness, feeling afraid or unwelcome 
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can potentially undermine successful participation in the court20. In response, the 
literature reflects that legal actors endeavour to be warm and approachable, and otherwise 
present themselves in ways that invite PMI to actively participate and seek assistance 
(Wexler, 2000; Winick, 2002). In this regard, Winick (2002) suggests: “Just as physicians 
need to develop their ‘bed-side manner,’ judges need to develop what can be termed their 
‘bench-side manner’” (p. 1069). Made explicit, judges endeavour to create a space where 
offenders feel comfortable expressing their emotions about their problems and dealing 
with them effectively (Winick, 2002).   
Indicator 3B) Verbal and Non-Verbal Communication.  
The literature differentiated between language that can be therapeutic and anti-
therapeutic in a MHC setting. It recognizes that the justice system is characterized by 
complex and highly specialized language that can create intellectual barriers between 
participants and the court (Goldberg, 2011). The failure of legal actors to instruct clients 
in a comprehensible manner is cited as a cause of non-compliance for PMI (Petrucci, 
2002; Redlich, 2005; Wexler, 1993).  
Thus, effective MHC actors avoid using language that is particularly formal, 
vague, or complex (Goldberg, 2011; Petrucci, 2002, Redlich, 2005). Also to be avoided is 
“legalese” or legal jargon, the use of acronyms, and sarcasm (Goldberg, 2011; Petrucci, 
2002; Wexler, 1993). Rather, effective actors adopt language that is simple, 
straightforward, and tailored to the participant’s specific level of comprehension. In 
particular, Goldberg (2011) recognizes simplified language through the use of short 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For example, “offenders will be less likely to recognize their problems and resolve to deal with them 
effectively if they perceive the judge to be cold, insensitive, or judgmental” (Winick, 2002, p. 1065). 
Further, Wexler (1993) emphasizes that a “moralizing, high powered stance” may intimidate the offender 
and undermine full participation (p. 279).  
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sentences and contractions (e.g., it’s as opposed to it is); active rather than passive voice 
(e.g., We understand as opposed to It is understood); and the use of first and second 
person in place of third person (p. 45).  
Additionally, the literature identifies the value of avoiding harmful or insensitive 
language, including labels, stereotypes, criticism, and threatening or punitive language 
(Kondo, 2001; Powel & Bartholomew, 2003). Failure to do so can intimidate and 
discourage individuals from actively participating and contributing to the MHC process. 
Effective actors are identified as utilizing language that is positive, uplifting, and 
supportive in nature (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2000). Further, 
Wexler (1993; 2015) identifies therapeutic benefit in using inclusive conversation in 
place of directive terminology. For example, statements commonly used in traditional 
criminal courts such as "what you are to do is" can be replaced by "what you have agreed 
to try is” (Wexler, 1993, p. 293).  
The literature also identifies therapeutic non-verbal communications that actors 
employ in the MHC. In particular, it suggests that legal actors should demonstrate interest 
in what is being said, and provide their undivided attention to the participant (Wexler 
2000). This can be demonstrated by sitting up straight, refraining from other activities 
such as writing, and maintaining eye contact throughout interactions (Goldberg, 2011; 
Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 2007). Further, actors consider the impact of facial 
expressions21 and, in particular, attempt to “look open to communication but still 
impartial, lift the eyebrows and slightly relax the mouth” (Goldberg, 2011, p. 37). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Goldberg (2011) notes that effective legal actors are aware of their facial expressions, which can 
unwittingly demonstrate disapproval or judgment. For example, “a so-called ‘neutral’ expression can 
come across as more severe than intended due to the drawing together of the eyebrows in concentration” 
(p. 37).  	  
	  	   30	  
Finally, conversation is conducted informally and conversationally, and actors adopt 
“tones that convey concern for the defendant as a person, without pity, disdain, or 
obvious condescension” (Bloom & Hereema, 2007; Goldberg, 2011, p., 34). 	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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
 
Chapter three outlines the methods used to conduct this study. The first section 
outlines the case study framework, which is followed by a detailed description of the 
research setting, sampling techniques, and the sample. The data collection procedures, 
including field observations and semi-structured interviews and the multi-step coding 
process are discussed. The last section presents remarks on the researcher’s reflexivity 
and the ethical considerations taken into account.  
Case Study Methodology 
 
This study employs a case study design framework, defined as “an in-depth 
exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular 
project, policy, institution, programme or system in a ‘real life’ context” (Simons, 2009, 
p. 21). In other words, case studies are a design of inquiry whereby the researcher 
develops an in-depth analysis of a case (Creswell, 2014). Cases may take the form of a 
single organization, a single location, a person, or a single event, and are bound together 
by time and activity (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Creswell, 2014). Within the study, “the case 
is an object of interest in its own right and the researcher aims to provide an in-depth 
elucidation of it” (Bryman, 2012, p. 69).  
Using this methodology, researchers collect data over sustained periods of time 
(Creswell, 2014; Yin, 2009). Case studies may be qualitative or quantitatively based, and 
utilize a variety of data collection procedures, including analysis of documents, archival 
records, and artifacts—as well as conducting fieldwork, interviews and observations—or 
any combination of these (Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2009). Baxter & Jack (2008) suggest that 
case studies should utilize multiple methods of data collection to ensure the topic is “not 
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explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses which allows for multiple facets 
of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood” (P. 544).  
Strengths  
 
Case study data are normally richer and more in-depth than other methodologies, 
and are particularly useful when investigating issues that require holistic, in-depth 
responses (Noor, 2008). Case studies are also appropriate to explain the complexities of 
real life situations, which may be difficult to capture through experimental or survey 
research (Baxter & Jack, 2008). In particular, they allow researchers to obtain multiple 
perspectives in order to explore the deeper meaning behind why a particular action 
occurred (Simons, 2009). For example, Gummesson (1988) notes that case studies 
“enable[s] us to study many different aspects, examine them in relation to each other, 
view the process within its total environment and also use the researchers’ capacity for 
‘verstehen’” (p. 76). 22 Moreover, case studies can be particularly useful to review and 
improve practice, which may subsequently inform policy development (Merriam, 1998; 
Simons, 2009). They are also utilized in instances when the larger sample or similar 
participants are not accessible (Simons, 2009).  
Limitations  
 
 Foremost, case studies are often criticized for their inability to produce 
generalizable findings (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Noor, 2008; Thomas, 2011). However, this 
potential weakness is limited to studies that intend to produce generalizable findings, and 
is further contested by Noor (2008), who suggests, “case studies also allow 
generalizations as that result of findings using multiple cases can lead to some form of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Verstehen refers to “understanding the meaning of action from the actor's point of view” (Sociology 
Index, 2015).  	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replication” (p. 1603). Further to this argument, “the method of generalisation for case 
studies is not statistical generalisation, but analytical generalisation in which a previously 
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the 
case study” (Rawley, 2002, p. 20).  
Additionally, case studies are criticized for their lack of scientific rigor (Noor, 
2008). Cook and Campbell (1979) note the absence of specific requirements to guide case 
study research, which expose it to criticism, especially from a quantitative perspective 
(Cook & Campbell, 1979). Moreover, given their in-depth nature, case studies are 
susceptible to researcher bias (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  
Use of Case Studies  
 
Rowley (2002) identifies three factors that determine the best research 
methodology for a given study, including: (a) The types of questions to be answered; (b) 
The extent of control over behavioural events; and (c) The degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events. Addressing these factors, Yin (2003) 
suggests case study designs should be adopted when: “(a) the focus of the study is to 
answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) a researcher has little or no control over 
behavioural events; and (c) the focus of the study is a contemporary (as opposed to 
entirely historical) phenomenon” (p. 2).   
Thus, a case study framework was appropriate for this study for the following 
reasons. First, this study addresses both “how” and “why” questions. In particular, it 
seeks to determine how the court applies the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence, and 
later explores why certain indicators are highly and weakly consistent with the literature. 
Second, the researcher did not seek to manipulate or control the research environment. 
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Rather, the researcher required an accurate portrayal of the court’s functions, procedures 
and interactions as to accurately assess its application of therapeutic jurisprudence. 
Moreover, the study examined contemporary phenomenon, observing and inquiring about 
the application of the therapeutic jurisprudence in the present day MHC.  
Setting 
 
The Ontario Court of Justice (OCJ) is a statutory court granted jurisdiction 
through provincial and federal law (Ontario Court of Justice, 2005). Over the years, the 
OCJ developed a series of specialized courts, including MHCs, which seek to address 
PMI in the criminal justice system. The observed MHC, located in South-Western 
Ontario, commences on Tuesdays in courtroom 104. The court begins at 10 am, and 
generally adjourns between 2:00 and 3:00 pm. Access to the MHC did not require 
permission for outside observers, as criminal courts are open to the public. 
As depicted in Figure 1, upon entering the MHC, wooden benches form three 
columns down the left, right, and centre of the room, which serve to accommodate 
accused individuals and any additional observers. A barrier, known as the “bar”, 
separates this seating area from the back half of the courtroom. Beyond the bar, there are 
two large desks facing the judiciary bench, divided by a speaker’s podium. Defence 
counsel and the accused occupy the left side, while the Crown attorney and MHC 
coordinator share the right. The judiciary bench is located at the centre, back of the 
courtroom, with the entrance to the judge’s chambers at its immediate left. A testimony 
stand is positioned to the right of the judiciary bench.  
Between the observation area and the judiciary bench, a designated work area 
seats two clerks and one courtroom transcriptionist. A prisoner’s box is located on the left 
	  	   35	  
side of the courtroom, with a security officer’s desk located to its right. Between the 
prisoner’s box and desk, a door leads to the court holding rooms, where prisoners are 
detained when required.  
A number of legal actors are central to the functioning of the MHC. The MHC has 
three permanent judicial officers who work on a rotating basis. It is noteworthy that, 
during the researcher’s observations, one of these judicial officers retired. As such, the 
researcher observed two additional stand-in judiciary officers, one of whom consistently 
filled in for the MHC. The researcher further observed the Crown attorney’s team, 
including one appointed team lead and two support Crown prosecutors, as well as various 
defense lawyers, and three duty counsel who are appointed by the court. Additional court 
supports include two clerks who are assigned to the MHC, a Constable for court security, 
one MHC coordinator from the Canadian Mental Health Association, and a range of 
representatives from various community services and resources.  
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Figure 1: Courtroom Physical Layout 
Sampling and Recruitment Procedures 
 
Participation in this study required that individuals have: a) some level of 
interaction with the accused; b) direct involvement with the court; or alternatively, c) 
consistent attendance and observation of the MHC. These criteria ensured participants 
could discuss the interactions between legal actors and the accused, as well as 
knowledgably answer questions pertaining to the court’s rules, procedures, and goals.  
The techniques of purposive sampling, with an initial gatekeeper, and snowball 
sampling were used in this study to select interview participants. Purposive sampling is a 
non-random method of selections where the researcher seeks to obtain a sample “due to 
the qualities the informant possesses” (Tongco, 2007, p. 147). The initial gatekeeper in 
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this study was a member of the staff who established contact with the Crown attorney, the 
MHC coordinator, and a designated MHC clerk.  
From here, this study utilized snowball sampling, which asks individuals to 
suggest any number of relevant individuals to includes in the sample (Goodman, 1961). 
For this study, individuals were asked to recommend participants who met the 
aforementioned criteria. Using this method, the researcher obtained six additional 
participants. 
In both stages of sampling, potential candidates received recruitment letters 
outlining the purpose of the study (Appendix A). Individuals who expressed interest in 
participating were provided information letters, which further explained the purpose of 
the research and their role as a participant (Appendix B). Prior to conducting interviews, 
participants were granted an opportunity to voice any outstanding questions or concerns, 
and a written informed consent to participate was obtained (Appendix C). 
Sample  
 
The sample consisted of ten participants whose involvement covers the spectrum 
of services and functions provided by this MHC. In sum, this included two MHC judges, 
the Crown attorney, two defense lawyers, one defense lawyer who commonly serves as 
duty counsel, one MHC coordinator23, one MHC support coordinator, one designated 
MHC clerk, and one community resource representative. Affiliation with the MHC was 
measured in years, ranging from 1-10 with an average of 6.7.24 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Of note, the court coordinator has a degree in Social Work.  
24  This MHC initially sat in 2005. 
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Table 2: Sample Characteristics 
PARTICIPANT ROLE PSEUDONYM YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 
Judge Roger 10 
Judge John 10 
Crown Attorney Renee 3 
Defence Lawyer Jeff 10 
Defence Lawyer Greg 9 
Defence Lawyer/Duty Counsel Larry 5 
Court Coordinator Jane 5 
Support Coordinator Claire 1 
MHC Clerk Sam 7 
Community Resource Leslie 7 
   Average   6.7 
 
Data Collection 
 
Data collection commenced upon receiving approval from the University of 
Waterloo’s Office of Research Ethics on April 2, 2015. The study utilized two data 
collection methods: participant observation and semi-structured interviews. Data 
collection occurred over a period of four months, from April to July 2015. This allowed 
the researcher to allot a minimum of two days worth of observations for each of the three 
designated MHC judges, and further granted some flexibility with interviews due to 
respondents’ busy schedules.  
Participant Observation  
 
The researcher conducted a total of 25 hours of participant observations adopting 
the field role of complete observer. Specifically, the researcher’s identity was unknown to 
individuals other than those interviewed. Observations were conducted on Tuesdays from 
10 am until the court adjourned, which typically occurred between 2:00 and 3:00 pm, and 
spanned over the months of April, May, and June 2015.  
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The researcher first conducted two days (7 hours) of preliminary observations. 
Information from these observations was not included in the findings, but rather, granted 
insight into the inner workings of the MHC. In particular, the researcher sought to 
understand the structure of the courtroom, including the rules, the nature of the 
proceedings, and the various actors involved. Further, the researcher sought to determine 
how interactions between legal actors and the accused could be observed. The researcher 
established that such interactions could be observed throughout the court proceedings, 
pre-trial meetings, and during recess breaks in the courthouse hallways.   
Following this, the researcher initiated 25 hours of non-participant observation.  
To determine how the court applies each principle of therapeutic jurisprudence, the 
researcher recorded observational field notes to capture data on how the court encouraged 
rehabilitation and reintegration; the rules and procedures of the court; and interactions 
between legal actors and PMI. Observations further included the general surroundings of 
the courtroom, as well as participants’ responses to certain treatment, procedures, and 
sentencing outcomes. For example, the researcher made note of any elements of the court 
or specific interactions that triggered negative reactions, such as crying.  
Moreover, the researcher originally intended to detail the number, and type of 
cases observed. However, this was somewhat impeded by the court’s fast and frequent 
adjournments, which often omitted details of the offence. Including these adjournments, 
the researcher viewed approximately 67 matters, which included: thefts, disorderly 
conduct, harassment, stalking, assault, sexual assault, battery, public mischief; breach of 
probation, uttering threats, and aggravated assault causing bodily harm.  
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Observations were recorded with a notepad, and were immediately transcribed 
following the court’s adjournment. This allowed the researcher to include any relevant 
information omitted from the handwritten notes due to the quick pace of the court. This 
further increased the accuracy of the events portrayed, as the researcher was more likely 
to remember relevant or significant details. All field notes were stored securely in 
electronic files that were encrypted and password protected. The hand-written notes were 
stored in a locked file in the researcher’s office. Only the researcher and the research 
supervisor had access to the data. 
The intent of conducting participant observation was twofold. First, given the 
size of the MHC, a limited number of staff was available for interviews. As such, 
observations were conducted to supplement the interviews rather than to serve as an 
equivalent source of data. Second, interview questions inquired about actors’ perceptions 
of the court and their interactions with PMI. This posed the potential for bias, whereby 
perceptions might not reflect the realities of the MHC. Direct observations allowed the 
researcher to address any major inconsistencies between observations and the interview 
data.  
Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
The researcher conducted ten semi-structured, face-to-face interviews. Interview 
questions were presented in a way that provided guidance, yet allowed conversation to 
flow freely and for participants to introduce any supplementary information of relevance 
(Huberman & Miles, 2002). Interviews were scheduled at a place, day, and time 
convenient for each participant, including locations such as personal offices, consultation 
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rooms in the courthouse, the courthouse cafeteria, judge’s chambers, and a Tim Horton’s 
coffee shop.  
Interviews were audio-recorded and supplemented with handwritten notes. This 
allowed the researcher to document certain themes that emerged throughout the 
interview, and further served as a backup in the event that the audio-recorder failed. 
Using Microsoft Word 2007, the researcher manually transcribed the audio-recording and 
typed the hand-written notes immediately following each interview. The researcher 
checked for errors by reading transcripts while listening to the recorded interviews. This 
ensured that transcripts were exact and ready for the coding process. The researcher 
identified the emergence of potential themes at the bottom of each transcribed document, 
as well as information that had overlapped with other interviews. This served to highlight 
any significant information, and assist in the preliminary stages of coding.  
Interviews consisted of fifteen questions and ranged in length from 45 to 90 
minutes (Appendix D). Interviews began with a series of introductory questions inquiring 
about the respondent’s association with the court, the duration of their roles, and general 
knowledge of therapeutic jurisprudence. Interview questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 respond to 
the research sub-question 2a: “How does mental health court promote therapeutic 
solutions? Second, interview question 6, 7, and 8, 9 and 10 respond to the research sub-
question 2b: “How does mental health court apply therapeutic rules and procedures?” 
Last, interview questions 11, 12, 13, and 14 respond to the research sub-question 2c, 
“How does mental health court facilitate therapeutic interactions?” A final question 
concluded the interview by asking participants to reflect on the information they 
provided, and to assess “what works” and “what does not work” in the MHC. Upon 
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answering each of these three sub-questions, the researcher was later able to answer 
Research Questions 1 and 2.  
Following the completion of interviews, the researcher conducted a follow-up 
interview on June 22, 2015 with one participant. This was to clarify significantly 
discrepant responses with respect to the indicators “teamwork”, “community resources”, 
and “balanced responses”. The researcher confirmed the individual’s responses, and 
included any and all discrepant information in the findings section. Following this, 
feedback letters were distributed to each participant’s email address thanking them for 
their time and involvement. Participants who indicated their interest in receiving the 
results from this study will do so in the form of a summary report upon completion of the 
researcher’s thesis defence.  
Data Analysis 
 
According to Saldaña (2009) there is no “best” way to code qualitative data. The 
various methods of analysis can: “(a) develop codes only on the basis of the emerging 
information collected from participants; (b) use predetermined codes and then fit the data 
to them; or (c) use some combination of emerging and predetermined codes” (Creswell, 
2014, p. 199). For this study, the researcher initially sought to utilize the first option, 
developing codes on the basis of emerging information. However, in the preliminary 
cycle of coding, the researcher recognized the need to modify this method of analysis. 
This process is described below.  
 For this study, respondents were asked a series of broad questions pertaining to 
the three principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. Interviews were supplemented with 
observations of the court. The data were examined to identify the ways in which the court 
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applies each principle. Initially, the researcher sought to develop codes only on the basis 
of emerging information from the data. The resulting codes would be compared to the 
MHC Model to identify areas of congruency and divergence. This comparison would 
address Research Question 2.  
Using the analysis software NVivo 10, the researcher planned to analyze the data 
in two cycles. The first cycle utilized open coding, which required the researcher to 
review transcripts line-by-line to highlight information that was “interesting, potentially 
relevant, or important to [the] study” (Merriam 1998, p. 180). Information was “coded” 
with descriptive terminology, including original labels as well as concepts from the 
literature. The researcher developed a codebook to track and organize preliminary codes. 
The participant observations and interview data were analyzed simultaneously.  
To an extent, the researcher expected the data to overlap with the MHC Model 
indicators. In particular, it was likely that respondents would address certain indicators as 
topics of discussion. However, this analysis unexpectedly revealed extensive congruency 
between the data and the MHC Model. In other words, respondents rarely discussed 
topics outside the scope of the MHC Model indicators. Thus, throughout the analysis, the 
researcher was consistently labelling data with codes that were synonymous with the 
MHC Model indicators.  
 To address this issue, the researcher recognized the need to modify the method of 
analysis. Given the sufficient congruency, it was logical to use these MHC Model 
indicators as predetermined codes to guide the analysis. Such would allow the researcher 
to organize information accordingly, and maintain consistent terminology throughout the 
study. These included: Consideration of Mitigating Factors; Collaboration with 
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Community Resources; Monitored Progress; Voluntary Participation; Teamwork 
Approach; Relaxed Rules/Procedures; Assistance throughout Court Process; Participant 
Inclusion; Family/Caregiver Inclusion; Therapeutically Enhanced Roles; and 
Verbal/Non-Verbal Communication. The analysis would also seek to identify emergent 
codes, which would include examples as to how the court applies any of the three 
principles that were not described by the literature.  
Upon modifying the plan of analysis, the researcher revisited the data to conduct 
the first cycle of open coding. Once again, the researcher scanned the data line by line to 
identify any important or potentially relevant information. Emergent themes were coded 
with descriptive labels, and information relevant to the predetermined codes was coded 
accordingly. The researcher conducted this cycle of analysis multiple times to ensure all 
of the relevant data had been recognized.  
The second cycle of analysis utilized “pattern coding”. During this process, 
smaller codes are collapsed under larger umbrella categories. This is an essential step in 
the coding process, as “coding is not just labeling, it is linking” (Saldaña, 2009, p. 8). In 
particular, pattern coding collects similar information, which in turn, makes relationships 
in the data more apparent.  
Foremost, a number of the MHC Model indicators addressed sub-topics. For 
example, “Verbal/Non-Verbal Interaction” outlined specific sub-topics as to how the 
indicator can be applied, describing the use of language, tone of voice, and body 
language. The first cycle of coding produced a number of sub-topics, which were 
originally labelled as distinct codes. During this second cycle, these sub-topics were 
collapsed under umbrella codes to maintain consistency throughout the study. For 
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example, the first cycle developed codes such as: “sympathy”, “empathy”, “respect”, and 
“approachability”. In the second cycle, these were identified as sub-topics, and were 
collapsed under the umbrella code “Therapeutically Enhanced Roles” (see Figure 3.2). A 
similar process was conducted for the codes: “Consideration of Mitigating Factors”; 
“Relaxed Rules/Procedures”; and “Verbal/Non-Verbal Interactions”. 
	  
Figure 2: Pattern Coding Example 1 
Further, in the first cycle of coding, respondents consistently described the court’s 
rotating staff as particularly detrimental to participants’ progress in the court. 
Respondents identified the various ways they attempt to address this potential 
impediment, and introduce an element of consistency into the MHC. For example, 
individuals identified the need for “consistent appearance before the judge”, “designated 
duty counsel”, and “consistency courtroom expectations”. The various codes were pooled 
together into the larger umbrella code “Consistency and Continuity” (see Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3: Pattern Coding Example 2 
In summary, the coding process produced two groups of codes. The first group of 
codes share titles with the indicators outlined in the MHC Model. The unexpected 
congruency presented the data in a way that allowed the researcher to comment on the 
degree to which responses aligned with the literature. This analysis also produced two 
emergent codes that serve as original contributions as to how the MHC applies the 
principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. All codes are presented in the findings sections. 
Reflexivity of the Researcher 
 
Qualitative research can pose a threat whereby the researcher’s personal 
inclinations or values may explicitly bias the proceedings and the findings of the study 
(Ritchie et al., 2014). The potential for bias can never be truly eliminated, as “there is no 
completely ‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ knowledge” (Ritchie et al., 2014, p. 22). However, 
researchers can minimize the potential for bias by recognizing their role in the research 
process, referred to in the social sciences as reflexivity. In particular, reflexivity requires 
the researcher to “reflect on their role in the study and their personal background, culture, 
and experiences [which] hold potential for shaping their interpretations, such as the 
themes they advance and the meaning they ascribe to the data” (Creswell, 2014, p. 186).  
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Prior to this study, I had limited knowledge of MHCs, and was unfamiliar with 
the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence. Rather, I was inspired to study MHCs by the 
case of Ashley Smith, a teenager who died by self-inflicted strangulation on October 19, 
2007 while under suicide watch in custody at the Grand Valley Institution for Women 
(Doria-Brown, 2013). On December 19, 2013, the coroner's jury returned a verdict of 
homicide in the case of Ashley Smith (Doria-Brown, 2013). The verdict served as a 
platform to raise awareness about the treatment of PMI in the criminal justice system. At 
this time, I was required to choose a topic for my Master’s thesis.  
At the onset, my position as a researcher did not pose any immediate or apparent 
biases. However, bias can be introduced throughout the various stages of data collection 
and analysis (Pannucci & Wilkins, 2010). In particular, throughout the observation 
process, I was required to use my discretion to categorize certain aspects and interactions 
of the court as either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic. It was possible that my personal 
conceptualizations of therapeutic and anti-therapeutic could have influenced these 
designations. In other words, observations that I considered to be anti-therapeutic might 
not have been conceived this way by others.  
I took a number of precautions to minimize this threat of bias. First, the MHC 
Model outlined elements of the court that have been identified as therapeutic and anti-
therapeutic in prior research. As such, the literature served as a source of guidance, 
allowing me to reference pre-establish conceptualizations of therapeutic and anti-
therapeutic rather than solely relying on personal conceptualizations. For example, the 
literature consistently identified hostility as an anti-therapeutic trait when interacting with 
PMI. In this instance, I was able to cross-reference the literature to confirm that my 
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categorization of hostility as anti-therapeutic was supported, and not due to a biased 
conceptualization.   
I further compared my interpretations of the data against participants’ responses. 
For example, throughout my observations, I identified impatience as a particularly anti-
therapeutic trait amongst the MHC actors. I referenced this against respondents’ 
interpretations of impatience as presented throughout the interview data. The data 
confirmed impatience to be consistently recognized as an anti-therapeutic trait among 
actors working with PMI. Throughout this process, I intended to address any major 
discrepancies in my interpretations of the data; however, such discrepancy never 
occurred.  
Further, I included thick, rich description in my observation notes. This prevented 
me from labelling data as therapeutic or anti-therapeutic at the onset. Rather, it required 
me to consider the details surrounding the particular event. For example, prior to 
categorizing a rule as “anti-therapeutic”, I sought to determine its purpose and whether it 
was a necessary component of the court. This process allowed me to contextualized and 
understanding information that might have otherwise been inappropriately deemed anti-
therapeutic.  
Ethical Considerations 
 
A primary ethical consideration involves obtaining informed consent from all 
participants in the study. In particular, consent must be based on an honest representation 
of the purpose and requirements of this study, as well as what participation entails, how 
data will be collected and analyzed, and future use of research findings (Creswell, 2014). 
Individuals were informed of these details prior to their participation in this study. In 
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particular, participants were given information letters, which outlined the purpose of the 
study, role of participants, data collection, data analysis, ethical considerations, 
confidentiality agreements, and implications on future research. Prior to each interview, 
participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time, and 
were granted a platform to address any outstanding questions or concerns. The researcher 
obtained written consent from each participant.  
With respect to anonymity and confidentiality, the Tri-council policy statement 
regarding ethical conduct for research involving humans (TCPS2, 2014) outlines that the 
dissemination of the research results should not identify participants as it may pose a risk 
to them. As such, the researcher took specific measures to ensure the privacy and 
anonymity of participants was respected and protected. In particular, the researcher 
referenced the court as “located in South-Western Ontario”. Privacy and anonymity of 
participants was further protected through the use of pseudonyms to reduce the likelihood 
of disclosing personal information (Creswell, 2014). Further, all identifiers were removed 
during the transcription process, including any references participants may have made 
during the interview to themselves, their coworkers, or the court. Together, these 
measures protect the identity of the court, and further prevent individuals from logically 
tracing answers back to the staff of the court. 
In sum, the interviews did not require participants to disclose any sensitive 
information, and therefore did not pose more than minimal risk for participation. Further, 
the researcher’s observations posed little risk to participants, as the courts are open to the 
public. In no way did the research jeopardize the confidentiality of those observed.  
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The data from this study will be retained for five years after which it will be permanently 
deleted from the two storage locations. 	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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS 
 
Respondents discussed each of the predetermined codes, which allowed the 
researcher to comment on the level of alignment between interview responses and the 
literature. Discussions surrounding each indicator both reflected and conflicted with the 
literature. Further, in many cases, respondents provided divergent responses that impeded 
such classification. Moreover, the analysis produced two original indicators as to how the 
court applies the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. This chapter presents the 
findings by principle. In so doing, it answers each of the three research sub-questions, 
including: 2a) How does Mental Health Court promote therapeutic solutions: b) How 
does Mental Health Court apply therapeutic rules and procedures; and 2c) How does 
Mental Health Court facilitate therapeutic interactions?                                
Principle 1: Outcomes Geared to Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
 
 The first overarching principle states that therapeutic jurisprudence promotes the 
provision of services and support that is aligned with rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Respondents were asked a series of questions to determine how the court achieves these 
goals. Consistent with the MHC Model, respondents discussed: balanced responses to 
crime, consideration of mitigating factors, link to community resources, and monitored 
compliance.  
Indicator 1A: Balanced Response to Crime.  
To achieve rehabilitation and reintegration outcomes, the literature acknowledged 
the need for MHCs to balance an appropriate response to the crime with effectively 
addressing the individual’s underlying disorder. Studies reported that MHCs generally 
rely on diversion programs, which are recognized as mechanisms to satisfy this balance. 
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Throughout the interviews, respondents consistently acknowledged a need for such 
balance; however, they disagreed as to whether the associated considerations are 
weighted appropriately by the court. 
The majority of respondents portrayed the MHC as being overly punitive, and 
argued that, in so doing, it fails to address individuals’ underlying disorders and 
associated needs to the extent it should. In particular, respondents suggested that MHC 
dispositions rarely differ from those found in traditional criminal courts, and consistently 
cited probation as the most commonly used disposition.25 Respondents also highlighted 
that, when necessary, dispositions included incarceration (although it was noted as less 
frequent than in traditional courts).   
 Further, all but two respondents disclosed that diversion is uncommon to the 
MHC. In particular, Jane revealed that a mere 11 participants went through mental health 
diversion programs in 2015.26,27 Claire also acknowledged this infrequency, stating: 
“Ideally, one of the main sentences that comes out of Mental Health Court should be 
mental health diversion. Unfortunately, I don’t see that often… they’re rare in our court.” 
This finding is particularly significant because, as noted, the literature suggests that 
MHCs regularly utilize diversion as a mechanism to satisfy the balance between 
responding to the crime and addressing the underlying disorder. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25   Some respondents described probation as a “default” sentence, which the court uses to protect itself in 
the event of recidivism. For example, Claire stated: “I think sometimes that our Crown attorney leans 
heavily on the safety to the community, in [the Crown attorney’s] view, and the impact on the victims. I 
think those are two areas that [the Crown attorney] puts a lot of weight on for sentencing… the Crown 
often are concerned for public safety to a certain degree, but also any sort of backlash if the diversion 
does not go successfully.”   
26   This count reflected the diversion rate up to July 2015.  
27  A follow up interview revealed that that, as of October 15, 2015, the MHC had accepted 117 individuals 
into the MHC, 6 of which were granted mental health diversions.  
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Respondents offered two explanations for the court’s limited use of diversion. 
Foremost, it was stated that participants may not qualify for diversion due to the nature of 
their offence. The MHC under study is a provincial court, meaning that its scope includes 
more serious offences that may warrant punitive responses. In addition, the court’s 
discretion can be restricted by mandatory minimum sentences. For example, John 
described how he is restricted in his sentencing by certain provisions outlined in the 
Criminal Code of Canada:  
Some of the offences are serious, you can’t be lenient. But you know, the 
judge does the sentencing with the input from the people who have worked 
with this individual. But you can’t – there are principles of sentencing you 
have to apply. You look at the Criminal Code, talks about – look at Section 
718 – it sets out the principles of sentencing in 718. Those are principles 
that I’m guided by. They don’t have exclusions, or exculpatory clauses 
saying, “oh by the way, these don’t apply to drug addicts, persons with 
mental illness… those are the principles that have to be applied to 
everyone. But, there are still circumstances of the offender.  
 
Roger further discussed how mandatory minimum sentencing compromises the 
therapeutic potential of the MHC:  
There are some cases that have minimum sentences, and this has become a 
real hot topic of discussion recently. This conservative federal government 
has removed a great deal of judicial discretion in terms of sentencing, by 
imposing minimum sentences on a number of charges. In the event that a 
person is found guilty of an offence which carries a minimum sentence, 
subject to an argument – lengthy, complex, and very seldom made – that 
the minimum sentence ought to be declared unconstitutional in relation to 
this case, the judge’s hands are tied. There has been some movement as a 
result of a recent case in the Supreme Court of Canada dealing with a 
minimum sentence for a gun charge, but that’s clearly restricted only to 
that case. And so, where I find myself faced with a minimum sentence, my 
hands are tied generally, and even though I may think that a more 
therapeutic approach is required, and that this calls for a probationary 
period, often I can’t do it. 
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As a result, a number of individuals in the MHC may not qualify for diversion due to the 
nature of their offence. In this regard, mandatory sentences effectively prevent the courts 
from providing therapeutic alternatives.  
Second, respondents discussed the critical lack of resources and the attendant 
implications for the use of diversion. In particular, a broad array of resources are central 
to the diversion process, which requires participants to engage in various community-
based programs and services designed to address their needs. Without an adequate 
resource base, the court is constrained from utilizing the diversion option.28  
However, despite these limitations, some respondents argued the court does 
effectively addresses participants’ underlying disorders and associated needs. These 
respondents highlighted alternative mechanisms that the court adopts in place of 
diversion. For example, the MHC frequently adjourns matters to grant participants time 
to engage in treatment that better positions them for sentencing. Roger described this 
strategy:  
Very often with Mental Health Court, we will adjourn things to permit 
considerable ongoing counselling, to permit a person to find some 
stability… to get some stable housing, to interact with the CMHA29 or 
whomever they’re responding with, to get reports from psychiatrists, to do 
everything they can to stabilize themselves and put their best foot forward. 
 
Further, these respondents noted that probation is frequently utilized by the court as a 
way to effect treatment or counselling by way of a specific term in the probation order. In 
this regard, Roger stated: “more frequently, we find ourselves engaging in an effort to 
assist the person in the community by imposing a suspended sentence and probation.” In 
this sense, the court tailors traditional sentences in ways that address participants’ needs.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 This issue is discussed in greater detail under 1C): Link to Community Resources. 
29 Canadian Mental Health Association  
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 In summary, respondents disagreed as to whether the court balances an 
appropriate response to the crime against addressing the individual’s underlying disorder. 
As noted, the court rarely utilizes diversion when dealing with offences that warrant 
serious or mandatory sentences, and is further constrained by an insufficient breadth of 
necessary resources. Rather, the court relies on traditional responses to crime, including 
the use of probation orders. As a result, the majority of respondents described the court as 
being overly punitive and, therefore, fails to adequately address individuals’ disorders 
and associated needs. Others argued that the court modifies traditional responses in ways 
that do address participants’ needs and, through this alternate approach, does effectively 
satisfy the requisite balance.  
Indicator 1B: Consideration of Mitigating Factors. 
Respondents acknowledged that, when possible, the court seeks to address various 
“spinoffs of the mental illness issue” (John). These include difficulties common to PMI 
that can potentially encumber progress toward successful rehabilitation and reintegration, 
including: the participant’s level of comprehension, and specific factors surrounding the 
offence. Respondents further highlighted the need to address participant’s housing and 
substance abuse concerns. However, despite these acknowledgments, respondents 
suggested that a lack of adequate resources prevent the court from effectively addressing 
these concerns.  
First, respondents consistently identified the court’s consideration of the 
participant’s level of comprehension. In particular, Roger described MHC participants as 
“people that often require a great deal of assistance. Their perceptions are different. Their 
method of thinking is often different. The way they conceptualize is different.” Jane 
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further described these varying levels of comprehension and how they affect participants’ 
understanding of the court and sentencing procedures:   
We have individuals with developmental delays who have the mindset and 
the thinking and maturity of a 5 year old even though they’re in an adult 
body… There’s some people that – like someone with dementia – they are 
not going to understand any of the philosophy behind sentences. It’s 
pointless. Someone who has a developmental delay, a pretty severe one, is 
not going to understand that at all. And if they do understand it, it could be 
very fleeting. 
 
As such, consideration of such limitations allows the court to determine an 
appropriate method of interaction with the accused. For example, the researcher noted 
numerous occasions where lawyers instructed accused persons to meet in the hall for 
further clarification regarding their sentence. Claire describes this process, whereby: 
Often, they won’t understand. They’ll agree to all these things… the judge 
will say the “do you understand” thing and they’ll say yes because they’re 
terrified; they want to get out of there. But they don’t. And so to review 
those with them afterwards and follow up with them is important, and 
something I try to implement. 
 
Multiple occasions were observed where the judge ensured the understanding of 
probation requirements by directly consulting the accused upon reading each term. In 
particular, judges would routinely pause after reading each term of probation to ask 
participants if they understand and agree. When participants did not understand clauses, 
the judge would attempt to explain them in simpler terms.  
Second, respondents identified that the MHC considers the situations surrounding 
the offence. In particular, the court seeks to identify and address “the issues of why [the 
accused] offended” (Jane). As such, the Crown Attorney initiates each hearing by 
outlining the details surrounding the particular offence. This information often includes 
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specific details regarding the circumstances that led to the crime, which in some cases, 
bears weight on the judge’s decision.  
For example, one observation involved an accused individual entering court on 
battery and assault charges. She had been incarcerated for a week, and was handcuffed 
and detained in the prisoner’s box. Her lawyer informed the judge of the individual’s 
numerous mental illnesses, as well as the circumstance surrounding the crime. 
Particularly noteworthy was that, prior to the offense, the accused individual’s boyfriend 
attempted suicide. The judge acknowledged this event as a likely trigger for the crimes 
that followed, suggesting they would likely have not occurred if not for the devastation 
brought on by the suicide attempt. The judge informed the accused of her immediate 
release and subsequently suspended her sentence. 
 Another observation involved the accused appearing before the court on charges 
of vandalism and property damage. The defence lawyer suggested that the accused, 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder, was triggered by two major events, including a recent 
divorce and the failure of his business. In particular, these events had caused considerable 
stress, which subsequently triggered a manic episode during which he committed the 
crimes. The accused was granted a conditional discharge with probation terms to seek 
mental health support and an agreed term in which he would take medication. The judge 
suggested that this sentence was not to punish the individual, but rather, to help him 
better handle and cope with his mental illness, stating: “Probation means to talk to 
someone, you seem to be isolated. I don’t see this as a punishment, I see it as a means of 
support.”  In this sense, without this consideration, individuals might otherwise be 
reprimanded for behaviors that were beyond their control. 
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Third, respondents acknowledged homelessness as a pressing issue among MHC 
participants. For example: “Often people with mental health concerns also have 
significant housing issues because it’s difficult to house people that are potentially 
disruptive or acting out” (Larry). Respondents identified additional reasons why 
homelessness is prevalent among PMI, including constant rejections by landlords and 
their inability to afford and consistently pay rent. For example, “I think also that people 
with mental illness sometimes have a hard time following through on day to day tasks 
like securing housing, paying rent, you know. Those things make it more difficult” 
(Larry).  
In recognizing both the prevalence and significance of this issue, respondents 
indicated that, when possible, individuals who serve as court supports seek to connect 
participants with various housing organizations. Further, a number of respondents suggest 
that these various supports assist participants in completing social housing applications, 
and accessing services that provide temporary beds to individuals in crisis. This is 
particularly significant, as the literature indicates that living conditions can impact 
clinical progress in addressing mental and psychological conditions. However, it is 
noteworthy that this assistance is significantly limited by the lack of available community 
resource, an impediment that is further described in the following section.   
Fourth, respondents acknowledged issues of substance abuse or addiction as 
exacerbating the disorder and undermining rehabilitation efforts. Moreover, most 
acknowledged that concurrent disorders are prevalent in the MHC. For example Jane 
stated: “There are a few where, it’s mostly a concurrent issue where the drugs seem to be 
a little more paramount of an issue, or a cause, or a precipitating factor rather than the 
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actual mental health issues, not denying that there aren’t any… but, it’s not the reason 
they’re offending and they’ve kind of exhausted our judges.” When possible, individuals 
suffering from concurrent disorders are often assigned to work with a dual-diagnostic 
representative, who further aligns the individual with treatment specific to their needs. 
However, these resources are also limited, which affects the court’s ability to address 
these issues. Again, this is further discussed in the following section.  
In conclusion, respondents confirmed that that MHC considers a number of 
mitigating factors that may impede on participants’ successful rehabilitation and 
reintegration. In particular, the courts seek to address the participant’s level of 
comprehension, as well as situational factors that might have caused or contributed to the 
crime. Respondents also identified the need to address housing and substance abuse 
issues, however, suggested that the court’s ability to address these factors is compromised 
by inadequate resources.  
Indicator 1C: Link to Community Resources. 
 
The literature credited successful rehabilitation and reintegration outcomes to 
participants’ involvement with community resources designed to address underlying 
disorders and associated conditions. However, as previously acknowledged, respondents 
consistently highlighted a significant shortage in the breadth and capacity of these critical 
resources. As a consequence, the court is constrained in its ability to facilitate 
rehabilitation and reintegration and to use the diversion option.  
Respondents typically discussed these limitations in general terms. For example, 
Jeff suggested the court could have a more profound effect on individuals’ with an 
increase in general services and supports:  
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[The MHC] does work but there’s a lot more you could do. Part of that is 
resources too – what we’ve got access to, which isn’t much. Not a whole 
hell of resources around here... and making things fly. And this is a Mental 
Health Court – it’s unfunded. We didn’t get mega bucks from the province 
or anything from anybody when we set this in motion. We just put it there 
and everybody does it and it works. It’s not – it’d be nice if they had access 
to more therapeutic resources, and better – as time goes on – what we want 
to do is expand the social services and support agencies that are attached to 
the court directly. 
 
John further highlighted the need for more resources:   
There’s so many people out there that have these issues. And we can’t 
accommodate every one of them, but we could probably have 10 mental 
health courts in this city. But you can’t do that… So what isn’t working is – 
I don’t think we are addressing everyone we can because it just isn’t 
possible… the resources are so limited. It’s an impossible task. 
 
In each example, respondents zero in on the lack of resources as a major impediment to 
the court’s ability to address participants’ underlying disorders and needs.  
In addition, several respondents described specific resource limitations. Most 
prominently, they identified significant shortages in resources to address housing needs. 
For example, Claire acknowledged that “[housing] is a tough one in this region as it is… 
there are significant waitlists for housing programs.” In addition, Jane highlighted 
shortages with respect to shelters and accommodations specifically for PMI: 
Probably the biggest limitation we have at this point in time is a limit of 
suitable crisis beds that will accept individuals who are just out of custody. 
And the crisis beds we do have are for a very, very, very, very short time. 
So you can get nothing accomplished.  
 
Moreover, respondents acknowledged that there is “absolutely minimal, if not zero, 
support – minimal is probably more fair – for people with concurrent issues. And there’s 
definitely nothing – no formal treatment in this area – for concurrent issues” (Jane). 
These inadequacies are significant, since homelessness and concurrent addictions are 
profound impediments to clinical progress in addressing mental and psychological 
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conditions (MacDonald et al., 2014). Equally important, they are recognized predictors of 
further criminal activity and, therefore, recidivism. 
Further, respondents acknowledged that resource inadequacies prevent the court 
from considering certain dispositions that would benefit accused persons, including, as 
discussed, the use of diversion. Accordingly, they introduce a dilemma, wherein: “If I 
don’t have the resources, I can’t do diversion” (Jane). As a result, the MHC under study 
is structurally impeded from considering diversion to the extent described by the 
literature. Instead, it must rely on alternate dispositions which, in many circumstances, 
will inadequately address the underlying needs of participants.  
In summary, respondents acknowledged the critical relationship between the MHC 
and an array of community resources and services. However, deficiencies in the breadth 
and capacity of these resources compromises the court’s ability to address the legitimate 
needs of participants. Moreover, this limitation prevents the court from embracing 
diversion as an option, and thereby creating a major structural difference with MHCs 
described in the literature. Together, these conditions undermine the court’s ability to 
address participants’ underlying disorders and associated needs and, in so doing, increase 
the likelihood of re-involvement in the criminal justice system.  
Indicator 1D: Monitored Compliance. 
 
The literature indicates that MHCs closely monitor the accused to increase 
compliance, track progress, and respond to emerging concerns. As mentioned, however, 
it also assumes that MHCs favour diversion as the primary disposition. In this regard, the 
literature describes monitored compliance as a component of diversion, and does not 
contemplate other dispositions, as utilized by the MHC under study. 
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On those occasions when the diversion option is used, respondents confirmed that 
the court does monitor compliance. For example:  
Well, basically what happens is the diversion generally is for 6 months. If 
[we] are unsure, and it’s mostly me because I meet with them prior to 
starting diversion, if I’m not sure that they’re going to engage or we might 
have some problems, we will have them come in after three months and 
just do a check in to see how things are going (Jane).   
 
However, because the court more frequently dispenses alternative dispositions, 
respondents suggested that it is difficult to monitor progress in the court. In this regard, 
respondents identified two innovative ways in which the court has been able to monitor 
compliance and the progress of participants.  
First, the court often grants a series of adjournments that allow accused persons to 
improve their circumstances prior to sentencing. At each appearance, their lawyers 
inform the judge of the participant’s current situation, including what he or she is 
undertaking, and whether additional time is required for the individual to better situate 
himself or herself for sentencing. The judge either grants additional adjournments or sets 
a final date for sentencing. This process allows the court to monitor participants’ progress 
over a limited period, and uses the possibility of a less severe sentence as incentive to 
engage in treatment or other support, and to stabilize their lives in other ways. 
Moreover, respondents identified that when participants are thought to need 
monitoring, the court will often adopt probation with conditions, as the disposition. In 
such circumstances, probation officers monitor participants, who are required to follow 
terms and conditions set by the court. Renee described this process, stating: 
So after there’s a court order, I don’t have any involvement in whether they 
follow it or not. I only hear about it if they don’t, and somebody decides to 
charge them with not following it. So a probation officer will lay a charge 
for not complying with their probation order if they think somebody is not 
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taking their meds… or they’re not going to the right counselling… or that 
sort of thing. Then that results in a new charge that brings them back into 
the court with a charge of not following the court order. 
 
John further described this as a “no news is good news” process, where “if you don’t see 
them, then that’s good news”. Additionally, judges may include a specific term during 
which individuals are required to report to the court for “check ins”. For example, John 
stated: 
But sometimes, I’ll put in a probation order that they come back and see 
me as a term of their probation. So I sort of … I usually pick a two month 
period – or if it’s a 12 month probation that they come back and see me and 
I pick a date and when they come back; I just see how they’re doing. 
 
In summary, the monitoring process of the MHC under study departs significantly 
from those MHCs examined in prior research due to its limited use of diversion. 
Although it follows that the court is unable to monitor participants as the literature 
describes, respondents identified that the court does introduce monitoring through the use 
of frequent adjournments, and as conditions set within probation orders.  
Principle 2: Therapeutic Rules and Procedures 
 
The second principle of therapeutic jurisprudence promotes therapeutic rules and 
procedures over ones that may be considered anti-therapeutic. Participants were asked 
five questions regarding how the court incorporates therapeutic rules and procedures, and 
avoids those considered anti-therapeutic. Overlapping with the MHC Model, respondents 
discussed: voluntary participation; teamwork; relaxed courtroom rules; including the 
accused in the MHC process; including the accused individual’s family in the MHC 
process; and assistance throughout the MHC process. Analysis of the data also produced 
the emergent code “consistency and continuity”.  
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Indicator 2A: Voluntary Participation.  
 
 In line with prior research, all of the respondents described participation in the 
MHC as voluntary. Individuals are first required to meet the criteria for participation in 
the MHC30, and are subsequently notified of their eligibility through their lawyer, or the 
MHC coordinator. Upon qualifying, the decision to participate is ultimately at the 
discretion of the accused. For example, “Coming into Mental Health Court, for the most 
part, if the person is able to agree, is voluntary. People don’t have to come into Mental 
Health Court if they don’t want to” (Jane).  
The voluntary aspect further extends beyond the initial acceptance to participate in 
the court. In particular, respondents noted that some participant’s perceive MHC as an 
“easy way out” or a “get out of jail free pass”. However, upon enrollment, participants 
often find it difficult to engage in treatments and address certain personal issues. As such, 
at any point in the court process, individuals are able to withdraw and return to traditional 
adjudication. For example, John noted:  
[The MHC is] not gonna work unless the person is involved. So it has to be 
with the cooperation of the accused. And if they’re not going to cooperate 
and they’re not interested, then, we have people that come in that don’t 
want to once they get in there… so they go back into the regular stream.  
 
Respondents further suggested that failure to demonstrate personal motivation may 
disqualify individuals from participating in the MHC. 
Explanations for the court’s voluntary nature further corresponded with the 
literature. Foremost, respondents identified that the court is legally prohibited from 
coercing individuals into treatment or to take their medication. For example, several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The court coordinator identifies potential participants for the MHC. Recommendations are reviewed by 
the Crown attorney, who ultimately decides whether participants are eligible. Jane explained that there is 
no formal criteria for participation, however, “there has to be a nexus between your mental health issue 
and the offence that you’ve committed.”  
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respondents made clear that the MHC cannot sentence a PMI with conditions that require 
participation in mediation, nor can they or impose taking prescription medications as 
prescribed. In addition to these legal restrictions, respondents identified that successful 
rehabilitation and reintegration requires the participant’s willingness to address their 
issues. As Renee explained:  
That person has to want to be there. I mean, we can identify the need, but if 
the person chooses not to take part in the specialized court, then we can’t 
make them. So, bearing that in mind, there’s an onus on that person to 
actually work with the supports that are being offered (Renee). 
 
That being said, respondents noted that individuals are often reluctant to participate 
in the MHC. In particular, the data suggests that many of these individuals experience 
anxiety about the court, with particular fears that involvement will lead to 
institutionalization. As such, potential participants often require encouragement and 
assurance from legal actors. For example,  
In a lot of cases, it’s an effort in talking to them to convince them to 
participate, because a lot of times they don’t want to. Or they don’t 
understand it. A lot of times they’re afraid. Unlike other people in the 
criminal justice system, they have by far the most to lose. And they stand – 
I mean, they could – many of them are literally locked up in hospitals for 
life, or years on minor offences. Or they are repeatedly incarcerated, in and 
out, in and out, in and out, week after week after week, for months, 
sometimes for years. And so they’re afraid. And sometimes there’s a need 
to work with them to try and show them the benefits to them of doing 
programs – of being assisted, so they understand that, at the end of the day, 
this isn’t just some jive talk, whitewash to lock them up somewhere. 
Because that’s what they’re afraid of (John).  
 
In particular, respondents described recruitment into the MHC as a “push and pull” 
process, whereby many individuals require prompting due to their inability to 
recognize their need for assistance. For example,  
Sometimes you’ll have people saying “there’s nothing wrong with me,” 
right? Or, there will be a lot of reluctance to even acknowledge that there’s 
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a mental health issue. And maybe this is the first time, for instance, it might 
be the first time that they’ve become involved in a criminal activity 
because maybe their schizophrenia is just coming out, for instance. We see 
that a lot... early 20s kind of thing…. Not previously diagnosed… so a 
manic episode or something. So that’s one reason why it takes a long time, 
sometimes. Because people have to be talked into being part of the process 
so they can be helped. So, I don’t think its as easy as just saying yes, cause 
I don’t think that they – because of their mental illness – they don’t always 
recognize (Renee).  
 
Recognizing this impediment, actors can work with PMI to understand the benefit of the 
court and take advantage of opportunities to receive assistance. However, the decision to 
participate remains at the discretion of the accused. 
In conclusion, subject to occasional prompting and encouragement, respondents 
ultimately confirmed that participation in the MHC is voluntary, and is at the discretion 
of the accused. Consistent with prior research, respondents’ reasoning for this voluntary 
participation is that  the court is legally prohibited from requiring individuals to engage in 
treatment or impose taking medications. Moreover, respondents recognized that 
participants’ success in the MHC rests on their personal desire and willingness to address 
their issues and engage in treatment.  
Indicator 2B: Teamwork.  
The literature describes teamwork as a central component of the MHC. However, 
respondents generally disagreed as to whether such collaboration is achieved. The first 
group of respondents confirmed the notion of teamwork, suggesting that stakeholders 
collaborate to craft informed, best-fitting responses for each participant. For example, 
Greg suggested, “the Mental Health Court can be good for bringing people together… in 
Mental Health Court, we can sort of get everyone together and put together some sort of 
plan for a person.” In particular, respondents suggested that this collaboration includes 
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the various individuals associated with the accused. Sam described these individuals, 
whereby:  
You’ve gotta have the Crown in there, you’ve gotta have the Mental Health 
Court worker in there, you have the defense counsel… if you have no 
defense counsel, there’s a duty counsel in there. More or less, if the person 
is determined to have a mental illness, the counsel and the Crown will talk 
about it with the worker of the region. They’re the ones who will determine 
the person’s situation and what’s gonna happen to the person… and also 
with the judge, too. 
 
Consistent with the literature, these respondents acknowledged that such 
collaboration is possible as the various stakeholders share a common goal to assist PMI 
and provide each participant with a best-fitting response to their situation. In particular, 
respondents described the court as a teamwork approach, where positions (e.g., 
understandings of circumstances or “statements of fact” presented to the judge), often 
overlap. For example, “a lot of the positions in Mental Health Court are joint positions, so 
counsel agree” (John). Moreover, respondents suggested that this collaborative approach 
is particularly significant, as it differentiates the MHC from traditional criminal courts. 
For example,  
All of those groups and people working together is pretty unique because 
it’s more of a team approach while still maintaining the traditional roles. 
But, you know, there are 2-3 counsel who work in that court quite often, 
and we will have sort of informal meetings or discussions leading up to 
court so that we sort of are working towards the same goal… still 
maintaining our – I mean there are still things that we differ on, by the 
nature of, you know, what we are doing – but there’s a lot, I think there’s a 
lot more communication and common ground going into the court (Renee). 
 
Conversely, a number of respondents disagreed with these notions of teamwork in 
the MHC, suggesting that legal actors rarely agree about what is best for the accused. 
Rather, they identified the court as an adversarial system, where legal actors have vested 
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interests that often conflict. For example, when asked to describe the court’s dynamic, 
Larry suggested,  
It’s still an adversarial system. The Crown’s role is different than the 
defence lawyer’s role, and the judge has a role altogether different than 
those two. So, it’s an adversarial system. It’s more collaborative in a sense 
that people try to direct a case in a way that they think is favorable to the 
stakeholders as best they can. But at the end of the day there are occasions 
where it’s not collaborative, it’s adversarial (Larry). 
 
Jane further described the court as adversarial, stressing the need for support workers to 
remain impartial, and refrain from siding with either the defence or the Crown attorney. 
Further to this, some respondents stated that dispositions, which are ultimately 
determined by one or two individuals in power, often fail to incorporate the 
considerations of other legal actors such as court supports and the defence lawyers. For 
example, Jane described communication between actors as: “Consult slash tell… there is 
a lot of directive collaboration, if you want to put it that way…”. This implies that 
dispositions are not decided by consensus or even a vote, but are ultimately at the 
discretion of one or two individuals.  
As such, respondents generally disagreed as to whether teamwork is, or the extent 
to which it is, a component of the MHC. A number of respondents suggested MHC actors 
work together to achieve a common goal to develop and implement a best-fitting 
response to their situation. These responses reflected the literature, which describes 
teamwork as a central component to the MHC. In contrast, other respondents described 
the court as an adversarial system whereby actors maintain vested interests, and rarely 
agree about what is best for the accused.  
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Indicator 2C: Relaxed Courtroom Rules.  
All respondents identified that PMI generally struggle to follow the rules and 
procedures of traditional criminal courts. According to Roger, “[PMI] simply have 
difficulty with the type of structure and formality and rule adherence that the rest of us 
hopefully get… I think that we therefore try to be a little less structured than you might 
otherwise see”. In particular, participants listed a number of examples as to how the court 
accommodates PMI with special procedures, and forgives instances that would otherwise 
warrant reprimand, including: court etiquette, talking out of turn, non-compliance and 
failure to attend. 
 Foremost, respondents described the MHC as relaxed with respect to formal and 
proper court etiquette. Specifically, participants are generally excused when they fail to 
address the judge as “your Honour”. Roger describes a related incident, stating: “I mean, 
I’ve had people call me your holiness in Mental Health Court… never mind your Honour, 
but your Holiness.” Participants are also granted leniency with respect to bowing upon 
entering and exiting the court, a transgression often cited by respondents. At the opposite 
extreme, there were reported instances where participants performed exaggerated bows, 
such as getting on their knees before the court. Moreover, “people aren’t disciplined for 
perhaps not standing straight or not looking the judge in the eye or having your hands in 
your pocket, those sort of things” (Larry).  
Respondents are also granted greater flexibility with respect to appearance and 
attire. John acknowledged this leniency, stating: “I’m never critical of people and what 
they wear because that might be all they have. So you have to be careful of that.” In 
contrast to the business-casual attire that was observed in the courthouse hallways, the 
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researcher consistently observed MHC participants in clothing that might otherwise be 
deemed inappropriate. For example, the researcher observed a young female enter the 
court in a mini-dress, and stilettos with metal spikes. The researcher also noted many 
instances of baggy sweatshirts and jeans worn in the courtroom; tank tops; displayed 
tattoos; bra straps; pants falling down because they were too large; and cold-weather 
jackets on hot summer days.   
Further, the data suggested that the court is generally more lenient with respect to 
talking out of turn and outbursts in the courtroom. For example, 
Judges in Mental Health Court try to maintain the dignity of the court but 
also are less likely to be reactive to people confronting them… I think 
people are a little more forgiving if people speak out of turn or show anger 
or upset or storm out the court and aren’t looked at as, I suppose, showing 
contempt for the court – as might ordinarily be the case in regular court 
(Larry).  
 
The researcher observed a number of instances where participants interrupted the 
interaction between the judge and the lawyers. In one particular instance, the researcher 
observed an audio call31 from a client who was currently serving time in a psychiatric 
facility. The Judge spoke directly with the accused to explain that she would be granted 
an off-grounds pass for one day  each week. However, the judge was consistently 
interrupted by the accused, who argued that she was well enough to receive an additional 
day of off-grounds privileges. Instead of disciplining the individual, the judge allowed 
her to express her concerns on numerous occasions, which was consistently followed by 
calm and slow explanations as to why her request could not be granted at that time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Individuals residing in psychiatric facilities can be connected with the court through audio calls. These 
calls are presented through the court’s speaker system, allowing each of the courtroom actors to interact 
with the accused.  
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 In another instance, the accused individual interrupted a conversation between the 
lawyers and the judge, stating “Can I just say something?” In an exasperated manner, the 
accused proceeded to describe how she had spent her life in psychiatric facilities and was 
“tired of it”. She further informed the court that she is “not a little girl anymore”, and 
wants “the opportunity to live the rest of [her] life” outside of the psychiatric facility. The 
judge and the lawyers sat quietly and attentively, allowing the individual to express her 
point of view over the course of approximately one minute. Rather than punish the 
individual for interrupting the court proceedings, the judge calmly acknowledged the 
individual’s concerns, and then delivered a hastened discharge as to prevent further 
agitation.   
  Finally, while respondents acknowledged the need to discipline consistent 
failures to comply, they simultaneously expressed understanding that individuals are 
likely to relapse. For example, John explained: “We’re not always successful, and you 
know. Every time I go in there and I see someone like… what happened…. ‘Well, I was 
feeling pretty good and so I didn’t take my medication…’” As such, respondents 
acknowledged that the court recognizes a greater likelihood of recidivism, and is more 
lenient in granting additional opportunities for eventual success. For example, Larry 
explained: “I think everyone tries a little harder to give people additional opportunities 
not to be arrested.”  
In spite of these relaxed procedural aspects of the court, some respondents noted 
that, for the most part, the court still maintains the rules and regulations of a traditional 
criminal court. For example, Jeff explained: “You have to maintain some formalities so 
they know the serious nature of what’s going on here.” Some individuals felt that the 
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courts modifications and accommodations were too modest to overcome the otherwise 
structured rules and procedures of the MHC. For example:  
It’s still that very structured, very traditional court. You still have the 
Crown against the defense. I think it’s intimidating and scary for 
individuals. I think the structured environment is difficult for individuals 
who have anxiety disorders or psychotic disorders (Claire).  
 
To illustrate, an aspect of the court that was noted as particularly anti-therapeutic is 
the in-court detainment, whereby the accused is handcuffed and confined the prisoner’s 
box. Claire acknowledged this, stating: “You know, coming in with mental health issues 
being cuffed and being thrown into this tiny little box can be tough – it can instigate 
psychosis for individuals who are struggling with that.” Further, Jeff identified that “the 
handcuff thing is always problematic too. A lot of them don’t need it. A lot of them are 
reactive to being handcuffed.” 
For example, the researcher observed a detained individual who became restless 
and disoriented, and repeatedly pleaded for release from the prisoner’s box. After being 
consistently ignored, the participant began to cry uncontrollably. Recognizing that this 
reaction was triggered by her detainment, the judge granted the participant’s release and 
relocation to the lawyer’s bench with her attorney, at which point she regained 
composure.   
In sum, respondents generally disagreed about the extent to which the MHC 
relaxes certain rules and procedures of the courtroom. Consistent with the literature, a 
number of respondents felt the court accommodates PMI, and is more forgiving in 
instances that would otherwise warrant reprimand. In particular, respondents suggested 
that the court is more relaxed with respect to: etiquette and attire, speaking out of turn, 
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and discipline. Conversely, other respondents felt that these accommodations did not 
adequately compensate for the structured rules and procedures of the MHC. 
Indicator 2D: Including the Individual. 
Consistent with the literature, most respondents felt that the accused individual’s 
input is, to varying degrees, incorporated throughout the decision making process. In 
particular, respondents identified that the court considers the participant’s wants, needs, 
and goals, as well as input as to how these could be best achieved. Respondents discussed 
the reasoning behind this inclusion, suggesting that individuals are more likely to invest 
in personally established goals:  
I guess the notion is, if you can incorporate what somebody wants, then 
they’re more likely to comply. Right? So if you can fashion a sentence or a 
program or a diversion scheme that engages the accused to do things they 
want to do – that they accept is in their best interest- you’re far more likely 
to be successful (Larry).  
 
Jane further elaborated, stating: “even in the diversion plans, the person is always 
involved. It’s gotta be their goals. If it’s not their goals, then they’re not going to be 
invested in it.”   
Participant input can be obtained through various means, including the accused 
individual’s lawyer, as well as the court coordinator. Input can also be obtained through 
direct interaction between the accused and the judge. For example: “In this court, there’s 
a view that the judiciary engaging with the accused is a good thing, and I agree. Where in 
traditional court, you’re always talking through your lawyer... the judge really can’t/isn’t 
supposed to talk to the person” (Greg). Roger further explained this method of obtaining 
input, stating: “To the extent that I am able to – to the extent that I am legally able to – I 
will give consideration to the needs and specific wants of the accused, absolutely.”   
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However, drawing attention to an apparent absence in the literature, respondents 
highlighted the critical need to establish boundaries when allowing participants to express 
their input. In particular, Claire acknowledged that granting participants with open 
platforms for expression can be “opening up a Pandora’s box”. This is to suggest that, in 
some circumstances, greater interaction can have negative implications. In particular, 
individuals may reveal information that can be potentially detrimental to their case. In 
addition, tangents may lead to topics that evoke negative responses. For example, 
There are times, we had a bail hearing about a month and a half ago, that 
the justice of the peace… I could see it, cause I wasn’t even in the 
courtroom… I could see it through the doors… just letting the person 
explode. There was no reason for that. No reason for that. But just kind of 
feeding into some of their delusions. And, sometimes, they’re not listened 
to for what they’re saying and that can cause them to escalate. But there 
was no reason for that. I spoke to this person and he was perfectly calm, 
and then when he went before the justice of the peace and was allowed to 
say his bit and talk about how he’s being persecuted by the police an all 
those things, obviously he escalated. He had a forum to do it. And he did 
and he did and he did until the justice of the peace said, “okay, I’m gonna 
send you to the hospital.” So how did he go from being perfectly calm, 
from having to go to the hospital within an hour? I don’t find that 
therapeutic. But that’s, you know, also experience. And some people think 
that they’re being helpful by letting people vent all of their delusions and 
that, and they’re not (Jane).  
 
Renee further confirmed the need for boundaries, as “[participants’] needs and wishes 
might not be therapeutic from our point of view at any given moment”.  
Although these responses corresponded with the literature in that participant input 
is generally welcomed and  participants are more likely to fulfill personally established 
goals, prior research  failed to acknowledge a need for boundaries in such interaction. 
This is particularly significant, as inclusion without boundaries can have negative 
implications, whereby participants can further incriminate themselves, or require 
intervention.   
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Indicator 2F: Inclusion of the Accused Individual’s Family.   
 Respondents disagreed about the degree and frequency to which family are 
involved in the MHC process. In particular, a number of respondents suggested that 
family is highly involved. For example, when asked if family is included throughout the 
MHC process, Leslie responded: “Oh absolutely. Family is invited to speak. If they’re not 
invited to speak, they can raise their hands and they’re gracefully invited to share their 
information with the judge… Very much incorporated.” This was further confirmed by 
Larry, who suggested: “I think family members, perhaps, are spoken to more in Mental 
Health Court than they are in ordinary court because, often times in Mental Health Court, 
family members appear more often with accused people.”   
Respondents identified various ways families are included throughout the court 
process. Foremost, they suggested that the court seeks to involve the accused individual’s 
family immediately upon arrest, as their knowledge is required to proceed in an informed 
manner. In particular,  
Right from the get go, the police are to involve the family immediately, 
because the families are the greatest source of information. The more 
information you have about the individual, the easier it is to assess whether 
they should be in the court. So families are involved. A lot of these people 
don’t have families, but…. Right from the get go, the police will try to find 
out as much about the family history as possible, because they want to 
resource the families. A guy is picked up on the street and he’s homeless 
but he’s got a mom and dad that live down the street… he just never goes 
there. But you go there and you find out his psychiatric history: “Oh yeah, 
he was in [the hospital], he was in [city name], his doctor is so and so, he’s 
been diagnosed with this and that.” So the families are involved as a source 
of information, throughout (John).  
 
Specifically, families serve as a source of information with respect to the accused 
individual’s psychiatric history.  
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Family often knows more about that person in terms of their mental health 
struggles than [the court]… sometimes people with an active mental illness 
aren’t the best historians of their circumstances either, so sometimes you 
need to speak to the family member to find out a little bit about the person 
that they aren’t able to or unwilling to share with you (Larry).  
 
Respondents also identified that, when appropriate, the court obtains family input 
with respect to the accused individual’s disposition. This input includes questions, 
concerns, or requests made by the family that are considered when crafting an appropriate 
disposition. Further, respondents suggested participants’ underlying mental health 
concerns can often impact the family in negative ways. As such, obtaining their input is a 
way to recognize these hardships, and hear considerations by those most affected. Roger 
described this inclusion, stating:   
I’ll engage family all the time in Mental Health Court, which I would not 
normally do unless it was a young person ... I will often give the family an 
opportunity to speak in MHC and ask if they have concerns or questions  - 
what can we do to help them… that sort of thing.   
 
Conversely, some respondents felt that families are less frequently involved with 
the MHC. Rather, “sometimes they’re expressly and exclusively ignored or shut out for a 
variety of reasons” (Jeff). Respondents offered various explanations as to why family 
input might be excluded from the MHC. Foremost, families are often victims of the 
offence making input more difficult. For example, when asked about the infrequency of 
family involvement, Renee responded: “Sometimes you can’t because the family are the 
complainants, so that makes it more difficult too.” Second, Jeff acknowledged that there 
is often tension between the accused and their family, whereby: 
The accused doesn’t want them involved because their goals are 
diametrically opposed – the accused wants to be out and the family wants 
them hospitalized… families resign, and hope that the system will 
somehow take care of their relative without the necessity of them becoming 
involved.  
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Of further note, some respondents suggested that family involvement can have anti-
therapeutic repercussions. In particular, they noted that families often have idealistic 
hopes as to what can be achieved by the MHC. According to Jane it’s generally  “family 
members who are really desperate… who walk into our court thinking that we are gonna 
force them into treatment, which we can’t do, and they come in with some 
misconceptions.” In such situations, MHCs may seek to intentionally exclude families as 
to avoid disappointment and frustration, and to prevent interference with the recovery 
process by establishing unrealistic expectations.  
  Third, respondents identified that families are generally absent and beyond 
contact, often resulting from a history of long, tiring struggles with the accused. Leslie 
described this absence, whereby “a lot of clients don’t have family, next of kin, contact 
people… often when I do an intake, I don’t have [a name for] who I call in an 
emergency… I have no one is the answer I get”. Further, in line with these statements, 
the researcher witnessed only two occasions when the court obtained family input. In 
these circumstances, the judge sought to inquire about the current living situation, and 
asked for clarification regarding a no-contact order. That being said, these observations 
did not account for family involvement that occurred outside of the courtroom setting.  
In conclusion, respondents generally disagreed about the extent to which the 
accused individuals’ families are incorporated throughout the MHC process. A number of 
respondents suggested families are heavily involved in relation to providing the medical 
history of the accused, as well as to provide their input regarding the dispositions. 
Conversely, others suggested that, as a rule, families are rarely incorporated throughout 
the process.   
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Indicator 2G: Assistance Throughout MHC Process.  
 MHCs are described in past research as complex and daunting for PMI. In this 
regard, the literature indicated that participants require a great deal of assistance to 
navigate the criminal justice process, typically through the form of court coordinators, 
support coordinators, or community-based case managers (Schneider, Bloom & Hereema, 
2007; Wolff, 2002). This study finds similar results, as respondents identified the critical 
roles of the court coordinator, support coordinators, and a psychiatric outreach nurse in 
assisting PMI throughout the court process.  
In particular, respondents indicated that coordinators hold a number of 
responsibilities that are critical to the participant’s ability to successfully comply with 
court orders. Foremost, the court coordinator visits potential candidates to determine 
eligibility in the MHC, and further facilitates a plan to best address the individual’s need 
and concerns. If the individual poses harm to themselves or others, the coordinator may 
choose the forensic route or suggest immediate hospitalization. If the accused individual 
is without a lawyer, the court coordinator will connect them with representation. Jane 
described this process as “a triage”, whereby:  
If somebody is really unwell, for whatever reason, whether drug induced 
psychosis or a mental health psychosis, then I will go downstairs into the 
cell area and speak with them and try to ascertain what’s going on. I’m not 
going to diagnose them, even if I probably know what’s going on. I’m not 
there to diagnose, I’m there to try and facilitate the next step. So if that 
means going to counsel, or getting counsel for the person if they need to go 
the forensic route, then I make that recommendation. If I think they need to 
go just to (location removed) Hospital just because there could be an 
immediate danger to themselves or others, or they aren’t able to take care 
of themselves if they are released, then that’s what I’ll do. So there’s the 
triage piece. 
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From here, coordinators determine whether any current supports are in place. For 
individuals who lack previously established supports, the coordinator establishes links 
with resources specific to their needs. Jane further described this function, stating:  
I help screen files to see who can come into Mental Health Court and who 
can’t, and then I will facilitate the supports that might need to be in place, 
and I will be the person who talks to the supports in the community if they 
are already existing to see what’s going on and how we can move forward. 
So that if they’re gonna be in mental health court, you know, let’s make it 
worth everybody’s while, and if something needs to be addressed, lets 
address it. Sometimes if they’re in a group home and they’re just not 
following the rules or the staff thinks they could be doing something… 
sometimes just being in court and having that little thing over their head... 
sometimes that allows people to move into the next step. It’s not the nicest 
thing, it’s probably not conducive to therapeutic as well, and sometimes it 
just helps people move forward. 
 
In addition, support coordinators assist PMI throughout the court process with a 
“hands on approach” by interacting with individuals before and after court to ensure they 
understand the court’s requirements. The support coordinator also attends court with the 
accused to provide both guidance and support. Claire further described this function, 
stating:  
So for me, it’s really important – I try my best to sit with them during 
court. I don’t just sort of stick them off in the corner somewhere. Again, 
it’s a little bit inevitable if I have four people being seen, obviously I can’t 
sit with all four. Just to kind of – I make sure I meet with them prior to and 
after court, to prepare them and debrief with them after what’s happened.   
 
Moreover, respondents identified the critical assistance of a particular psychiatric 
outreach nurse. In addition to providing and aligning the accused with supports, the 
psychiatric nurse was described as playing a critical role in providing assistance 
throughout the court process and, in particular, upon release from custody. Leslie 
described this assistance, stating:  
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For anyone who may be released from custody and may need support – I 
have taken people to the soup kitchen following custody if they are not 
familiar with it. Or if they needed to go to the bank following release. If 
they don’t know how to get through probation, I can help them get through 
that.  
 
In summary, respondents identified the court coordinator, support coordinators, and 
a psychiatric outreach nurse as critical in assisting PMI throughout the court process. 
Respondents consistently indicated that these various types of assistance are highly 
valued by members of the MHC. In particular, each was recognized as a link that bridges 
the gap in communication and understanding between the court system and PMI, as well 
as providing a sense of comfort throughout the often-overwhelming court process.  
Emergent Code 2H: Consistency and Continuity.  
 
Respondents identified the therapeutic benefit of consistency and continuity in the 
courtroom. In addition to frequent adjournments, the court generally rotates among four 
designated MHC judges, as well as various individuals who serve as duty counsel. As a 
result, participants can make multiple appearances before various legal actors. 
Respondents noted that constant rotation of this nature can be overwhelming in an 
already complex court system, whereby “one day they are working with Tim that’s duty 
counsel, and then Sally that’s duty counsel, and then it’s Billy that’s the duty counsel. 
And they sort of feel tossed around” (Claire).  
As such, respondents acknowledged the therapeutic value of increased consistency 
and continuity in the court. In particular, respondents noted the court’s attempt to create a 
sense of consistency in spite of a rotating staff. For example, as observed on a number of 
occasions, judges requested specific matters to be rescheduled to a date when they were 
sitting in court. For example:  
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Sometimes I’ll see that the judges will, even after they’ve sentenced 
someone, they’ll say, “I know I’ve sentenced you but I want you to come 
back in a month – I want to see how you’re doing.” That doesn’t usually 
happen in the other courts. Also because we see the same people, some 
people, over and over, there’s a recognition too. The judges will say, “Well 
I remember I was the one who put you on this probation order, and why 
didn’t it work? Can you tell me what is not working for you here? (Renee).  
 
This was further observed by the researcher on a number of occasions. For example, on 
one occasion the judge requests that two individuals consistently appear before him in the 
future. In both cases, the individuals appeared frequently at the MHC, and suffered from 
a series of complex mental illnesses. Familiar with the intricate details surrounding each 
case, the judge established this consistency to preserve a measure of continuity in the 
recovery process.   
Respondents identified that such consistency is beneficial in two respects. 
Foremost, it allows the often anxious participants to appear before a familiar face, with 
some indication of what to expect. Renee argues that appearing before the same judge 
provides  for “continuity in the approach, continuity in the language, continuity in the 
expectations… that kind of thing”. Second, it ensures continuity in the disposition, where 
the judge is fully informed of the accused individual’s progress and can subsequently 
make informed decisions in proceeding with the next step. For example, Roger explained:  
I try to set out expectations clearly, and then I try to – if they are coming 
back before me – I try to have a note so I can remind them, I can say “last 
time you were here, here’s what we talked about – what have you done?” 
That sort of thing, just to make sure that they understand that there’s some 
consistency/expectation that has to be met… that sort of thing. 
 
In summary, respondents identified that consistency and continuity are critical 
aspects of the MHC process. Amidst a rotating staff, the court seeks to create a sense of 
consistency by ensuring participant’s appear before the same legal actors. The presence 
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of a familiar face can ease participants’ anxiety, providing them with some indication of 
what to expect further at their court dates. This further ensures continuity in the 
disposition, allowing the judge to proceed in an informed manner. Further, it is 
noteworthy that this indicator is particular significant as it was previously unaddressed by 
the MHC Model, and thus serves as an original example of a procedure to enhance the 
positive outcome of participants. 
Principle 3: Therapeutic Interactions 
 
The final principle of therapeutic jurisprudence promotes therapeutic interactions 
over those that might be considered anti-therapeutic. Participants were asked five 
questions to determine how legal actors encourage therapeutic interactions and avoid 
anti-therapeutic interactions in the MHC. Overlapping with the MHC Model indicators, 
respondents discussed therapeutic traits, as well as verbal and non-verbal language. 
Analysis of the data also produced “experienced stakeholders” as an original code. 
Indicator 3A: Therapeutically Enhanced Roles. 
 
Respondents discussed a number of characteristics they adopt to enhance 
therapeutic interactions with PMI. Consistent with the literature, respondents discussed 
their attempts to convey encouragement and compassion, and enhance their 
approachability. In addition to these, respondents identified the need for actors to practice 
greater patience when working with PMI. 
First, a number of respondents acknowledged the need for greater encouragement 
towards PMI. In particular, they suggested that MHC actors commonly use positive 
reinforcement to recognize and encourage participants’ progress. Greg described such 
interactions, whereby:  
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A lot of it’s just good, positive reinforcement: “Hey, you came here 2 
weeks ago and you’re doing much better. You’re here with your worker”… 
cause a lot of people come with some sort of worker, you know… “Your 
worker is saying that things are going good! That’s good, that’s good, keep 
it up, come back in a couple of weeks and tell me how well you’re doing!” 
You don’t get that in normal court (Greg).  
 
Consistent with this account, the researcher observed legal actors encouraging PMI 
throughout the court process. In particular, judges consistently praised participants’ 
successes, stating “well done”, and “keep up the good work”. For example, on one 
occasion, the researcher observed the presiding judge read a letter from the participant’s 
treatment program outlining their progress. The judge commended this progress, stating 
both “well done” and “you have done very well” to the participant. Another example of 
this was observed when the judge praised the accused individual’s initiative, stating: 
“You did a good thing moving away from [city name] and crystal meth. You’re doing 
well, and I want you to continue doing well.” Additionally, the researcher consistently 
observed judges wishing participants “good luck” upon exiting the court, which further 
encouraged their success.  
Respondents further discussed the importance of encouragement in the MHC, 
suggesting participants are more likely to comply and follow through with court orders 
when they are encouraged and motivated. Significantly, this explanation corresponds 
with the literature, which identified encouragement as an effective strategy to spark 
motivation, thereby increasing compliance. Respondents further proposed that praise for 
accomplishments can instill a sense of achievement which, in turn, motivates participants 
to succeed.    
Second, respondents expressed the need to increase their approachability in the 
MHC. In particular, they acknowledged that PMI generally experience heightened 
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anxiety and intimidation in the court system. In an attempt to alleviate these adversities, a 
number of respondents described their efforts to appear kinder, warmer, and more 
approachable. For example, Roger suggested that MHC judges adopt an approachable 
attitude in the MHC as to diminish participant’s fears and intimidations:  
Most judges, I think, when they’re in the mental health court, are… have an 
attitude of being a little more approachable, more affable. From my 
perspective, I try not to be – to appear intimidating unless it’s necessary. I 
try to be affable and I try to appear concerned – I am concerned. And I try 
to be approachable. I try to be human. I try to be more of a person than a 
figure… than an official. I try to engage them personally in conversation. I 
try to be interested in their circumstances – what they’re doing, how they 
feel, what they think they need. I try to be encouraging. 
 
In this sense, Roger suggests that actors can increase their approachability by diminishing 
their role as legal figures, and engage participants as equals.  
One way that actors can achieve this is through the use of humour. For example, 
Greg described his use of humour as a means to make clients feel at ease and recognize 
him as an equal as opposed to an authority:  
I swear a lot… I downplay the offence, you know? Like you get a 
screening for them and you’re like: “Jail! What?! For a good guy like you?! 
Oh my God, that’s ridiculous…” – that type of stuff. And they’re like, 
“Hey, you don’t talk like other lawyers!” That type of stuff. So, yeah, I … 
you know, try and show that I’m not that much different from them. I know 
I’m wearing a suit and all that other stuff but… I don’t know.  
 
John also discussed his attempts to incorporate light humour into conversations with the 
accused, stating: “In Mental Health Court– you know, you get the hockey sweaters... and 
I try to engage and say things like ‘I’m going to do this, notwithstanding that you are a 
Ottawa Senators fan.’”  
In addition to humour, Renee described small but significant elements of 
interaction that encourage participants to see her as friendly and welcoming:  
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Sometimes I’ll call people by their first names, which you’re not supposed 
to do in court. I mean, sometimes I’ll have a quiet conversation as they’re 
approaching, just sort of “how are you doing” – just something that I would 
never do in a regular court. You know, that you know would be really 
improper for me to do. So it’s really tiny things. I’m hoping that it’s 
something that makes them feel a bit more comfortable, less stressed. I 
mean certainly we’re always aware. I mean I know certain people who just 
can’t wait. If they make it to court at all, that’s a miracle… and so I will try 
to make sure those people get in and out kind of quickly, that kind of thing. 
I mean, just individual stuff like that that you might not take into account in 
a regular court.  
 
Using the described tactics, legal actors minimize court formalities and diminish their 
roles as legal figures, thereby instilling a sense of ease in participants. This, in turn, 
creates a relaxed atmosphere in which PMI are more willing to interact. 
Third, all of the respondents addressed the need to convey sympathy and 
compassion towards MHC participants. In particular, respondents demonstrated a 
common understanding that PMI are generally not in complete control of their actions, 
and further acknowledged a number of obstacles and hardships these individuals face due 
to their mental disorders. For example, Sam noted:  
There is a caring aspect of it in this court. You realize that people should be 
treated differently… I guess the gentleness of the approach to that person… 
the way you talk to them. Your empathy… you want to understand that 
person.  
 
Roger further expressed his attempts to convey sympathy, stating:  
I try to be understanding. I often talk to them about understanding all of the 
mental and emotional baggage they bring with them and…. Being 
sympathetic in the sense that – making them understand that I appreciate 
that their circumstances are extremely difficult. I try to make the system in 
the most case less intimidating for them.   
 
As such, respondents overwhelmingly expressed sympathy and compassion for MHC 
participants, and recognized the need to convey these emotions. 
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Respondents further discussed the significance of conveying sympathy. In 
particular, a number of respondents suggested that a lack of sympathy and compassion 
can be counterproductive to PMI. In particular, unwarranted harshness can trigger 
negative reactions from participants, and discourage them from actively participating in 
the court or seeking assistance. Moreover, some respondents suggested that expressing 
empathy for individual’s situations is human nature, and allows them to fulfill a personal 
desire to demonstrate compassion. For example, when asked why sympathy is an 
important aspect in the MHC, Renee responded: “Partly it’s for me, because, you know, 
we are all human right? And I just want to sort of take a moment to acknowledge that I’m 
thinking about the person, maybe.” In this sense, Renee suggests that demonstrating 
compassion is a way to convey appreciation for participants’ difficulties.  
Last, several respondents identified a greater need for patience in the MHC. For 
example, Larry identified the need for a “certain type of personality” whereby, “if you’re 
not patient, you wouldn’t last.” In particular, respondents described PMIs involvement 
with the MHC as generally lengthy, with frequent procedural delays stemming from non-
compliance and recidivism. In addition, respondents suggested that interactions are often 
met by a number of obstacles. For example:  
Oftentimes, an accused person can be hostile or standoffish or non-
communicative or just difficult. So, first thing is not to escalate the 
situation. I’ve had to learn over the years not to respond sometimes when 
you feel like responding and just let things go because that just tends to 
make things worse. So I think you have to be flexible when you deal with 
people in Mental Health Court, I think you have to be patient, I think you 
have to sometimes just let people talk, even if it doesn’t make a lot of 
sense, and even if it takes 10 times longer than it should (Larry). 
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In this sense, actors require a considerable amount of patience and dedication when 
working with PMI. In particular, they must remain calm and collected throughout these 
delays and obstacles as to encourage and facilitate therapeutic interactions.  
In summary, respondents described their adoption of various characteristics to 
enhance therapeutic interactions with PMI. A number of characteristics overlapped with 
those identified in past research, including enhanced encouragement, approachability, 
sympathy, and compassion. Moreover, individuals identified the need for patience, which 
was previously unaddressed by the literature.  
Indicator 3B: Verbal/Non-Verbal Communication.  
 
Consistent with previous findings, respondents discussed their attempts to increase 
the use of therapeutically beneficial language and avoid anti-therapeutic language in the 
MHC. In particular, individuals overwhelmingly acknowledged attempts to avoid legal 
jargon when interacting with PMI, suggesting that formalized legal language can be 
confusing and overwhelming for PMI. For example, Roger stated:  
I try to avoid legalese, and I try to speak in terms that the person can 
understand. Sometimes that allows me to engage them in a pretty normal 
way. At least in terms of the language I use. In other words, using lots of 
legalese and speaking in a way that clearly they can’t possibly comprehend, 
and being just a cog in the wheel of the system. I just think that all of that is 
absolutely useless.  
 
Jane further expressed the need to avoid legal jargon, stating: “Pretty much with all 
participants, you can’t use legal jargon. Like I would not say to someone, ‘look you just 
can’t form the mens rea in order to meet…’ that’s not – they’re not going to understand 
that.”  
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In place of formalized language, respondents discussed their efforts to 
communicate in a language understood by PMI. In particular, respondents generally 
described this language as “simpler”, “more direct”, and “less colourful”. For example,  
Sometimes, depending on the disability, I have to speak to them as I would 
speak to a young child. I have to use much simpler terms. I have to engage 
them on their level, if you will, and try to engage them in such a way that 
they can comprehend what I’m trying to get across…and sometimes, what 
I’ll say is to the person in MHC, that I’ll speak to them in a more simple 
fashion. And then I’ll say, “I have to give some reasons here and they’re 
gonna be a little more difficult than – don’t worry about it. What I’m 
essentially saying in a more formal way is what I just told you.” And I will 
then perhaps formalize my reasons a little bit and dress them up a little bit. 
But I will attempt to make sure that the person understands the gist of what 
I’m saying, if possible (Roger).  
 
In this sense, Roger suggests that there is not a standardized set of words adopted by the 
MHC, but rather, that language is tailored to each participant’s specific level of 
comprehension. In so doing, legal actors present information in a way that each 
participant is able to understand, thereby increasing their ability to fulfill court orders. 
This is particularly significant, as the literature suggests that the failure to instruct actors 
in way that is comprehensible is likely to result in non-compliance (Goldberg, 2011). 
Moreover, respondents identified several forms of non-verbal communication that 
are used to enhance therapeutic interactions with PMI. In particular, a number of 
individuals noted the use of a softer, gentler tone when addressing PMI. This was 
observed on numerous occasions, whereby the researcher noted the judge’s shift to a 
significantly softer, calmer tone when interacting with the accused compared to 
interactions with legal personnel.  
In addition, the researcher observed a number of seemingly therapeutic non-
verbal interactions. For example, on a number of occasions, various defence lawyers 
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placed their hands on the arms, backs, or shoulders of the accused. This was typically 
observed when individuals were required to speak to MHC personnel or directly interact 
with the judge. Both situations directed attention to the accused, which likely enhanced 
feelings of nervousness and anxiety. It appeared as though these hand placements calmed 
the nerves of the accused, and reminded and encouraged them when it was their turn to 
speak. As such, the researcher interpreted these gestures as a source of comfort that 
reassured the accused of their lawyer’s support.  
 The researcher further observed the judges’ use of direct eye contact with the 
accused. This was particularly apparent when reading probation terms, where judges 
consistently made eye contact with the accused after each term was read. The researcher 
also noted four separate occasions on which judges repositioned their chairs to lean closer 
to the accused during direct interaction and, on two instances, repositioning their chair to 
be closer to the individual in the prisoner’s box.   
In sum, respondents consistently reported and demonstrated efforts to increase the 
use of therapeutically beneficial language, and to avoid anti-therapeutic language in the 
MHC. These findings are particularly significant, as the literature suggested that 
confusing or harmful language in the courtroom has the ability to create intellectual 
barriers between the accused and the court, which can ultimately result in non-
compliance. Further, the researcher noted a number of non-verbal communications that 
allowed actors to demonstrate interest and concern for PMI and encourage their 
participation.  
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Emergent Code 3C: Experienced Stakeholders.  
 
 Respondents identified experience among legal actors as a critical component in 
facilitating therapeutic interactions with PMI. In particular, throughout the interview 
process, respondents highlighted the fact that the court does not offer any training  prior 
to working in the MHC. As a result, actors new to the MHC may not be aware of certain 
interactions that can trigger negative responses in the accused or otherwise not be in their 
best interests. For example,  
I have seen a lawyer get quite rude and short with his clients, yelling at 
them. Not the approach I would take. I have seen lawyers – like the case 
we’re doing now – who have no familiarity with mental health issues and 
are out of their depth. And that troubles me, because the client is not being 
well served. In many cases, a person more familiar with the mental health 
aspects of the Criminal Code and the Mental Health Act could achieve 
better results for their clients (Roger).   
  
 In this particular case, the accused, diagnosed with various disorders including a 
debilitating learning disability, was further removed from the proceedings due to a 
language barrier. These factors appeared to cause the accused person anxiety, as he 
consistently spoke out and cried throughout the court process. Becoming increasingly 
frustrated with the accused, the lawyer responded in an exasperated manner, stating: “you 
need to stop talking. You are not doing yourself any favours here.” Following this, the 
lawyer expressed numerous warnings, and at one point, told the translator to inform the 
accused that “he is going to get himself back into jail if he doesn’t stop.” These responses 
appeared to have an adverse effect, as the accused began to act out from what appeared to 
be heightened fear and confusion. Further to his observation, John indicated that new 
lawyers are often hesitant to allow their clients to speak in court, assuming that doing so 
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will be to their detriment. John suggested that this is not necessarily true, and that doing 
so strips PMI of the opportunity to participate and voice their opinion in the court.  
 By acknowledging these shortcomings, which are often the result of inexperience, 
most of the respondents agreed that, all else being equal, experienced actors are better 
able to facilitate therapeutic interactions with PMI. In particular, experience affords 
individuals with the knowledge required to provide therapeutically beneficial treatment to 
PMI and, equally important, to avoid such interactions with the potential to instill fear,  
anger or to trigger outbursts. As such, respondents suggested that the court should seek to 
engage actors who have experience working with PMI. For example:  
We have duty counsel who come to MHC and have some expertise in 
dealing with those who are suffering from mental illness. You wouldn’t 
find that in a regular court. And indeed… well we don’t have duty counsel 
there. We have duty counsel who are familiar and experienced in dealing 
with mentally ill people and that makes a big difference (Roger). 
 
Further, Renee noted that the designated MHC judges are often experienced in working 
with PMI:  
The judges we have in mental health court are more understanding of 
mental health issues, they have a better understanding of the section of the 
Criminal Code that deals with mental health issues, they have a better 
understanding of the Mental Health Act, they’re more patient with our 
accused, they’re more inclined to say “okay if we are going to adjourn this 
what are you going to be working on?”   
 
Indeed, a number of MHC employees did have prior experience working with PMI. 
In particular, one previously worked as a nurse, and another served as a case coordination 
counsellor, specifically working with adult men diagnosed with schizophrenia. A third 
respondent indicated having experienced mental illness in his family, which shaped his 
desire to work in the MHC.  
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As such, respondents identified experience working with PMI as a critical asset in 
facilitating therapeutic interactions in the MHC. In particular, without experience or 
training, actors may not be aware of certain interactions that can trigger negative 
responses in the accused or otherwise not be in their best interests. In this sense, actors 
suggested that MHCs should take the initiative to train staff or hire actors with experience 
working with PMI.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONLCUSION 
 
 This final chapter is divided into two sections. First, the discussion section 
addresses the research question: What are the core principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and the indicators of each? Using the data collected for this study, this 
section then answers the second research question: Does the application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence principles in the MHC under study reflect the MHC Model? The results are 
analyzed and discussed. Second, the conclusion section outlines the implications of this 
study and recommendations for future research.  
Discussion 
 
To answer the first question, the researcher reviewed the literature to extract and 
consolidate a) a list of the overarching principles of therapeutic jurisprudence and b) 
indicators of how each is applied in a MHC setting. This information was consolidated 
into the MHC Model, which is repeated as Table 3 for the reader’s convenience. 
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Table 3: Mental Health Court Model 
PRINCIPLES  INDICATORS OF PRINCIPLES 
1) Goals a) Balancing rights with care  
b) Consideration of Mitigating Factors 
c) Collaboration with Community Resources 
d) Monitored Progress 
 2) Rules a) Voluntary Participation 
b) Teamwork Approach 
c) Relaxed Rules/Procedures 
d) Assistance throughout Court Process 
e) Participant Inclusion 
f) Family/Caregiver Inclusion  
3) Interactions a) Therapeutically Enhanced Roles  
b) Verbal/Non-Verbal Communication 
 
The development of the MHC Model was a necessary step in answering the 
second research question. In particular, interview questions sought to determine how the 
court applies the principles established by the MHC Model. In addition, the Model is later 
compared to the findings in order to identify areas of higher and lesser consistency. In so 
doing, the researcher was able to generate recommendations for greater consistency with 
the principles, which might be considered in order to improve the court’s functioning 
and, potentially, its outcomes. 
 To answer the second research question, it was first necessary to determine how 
the MHC being studied applies the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. To this end, 
respondents were asked a series of interview questions embedded within three 
overarching questions: a) How does Mental Health Court promote therapeutic solutions; 
b) How does Mental Health Court apply therapeutic rules and procedures; c) How does 
Mental Health Court facilitate therapeutic interactions? In addition, the researcher 
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conducted 25 hours of observation to supplement data from the interviews. The data 
analysis was guided by predetermined codes (the indicators identified in the MHC 
Model), and further sought to establish emergent codes. The findings were presented in 
Chapter 4. 
The researcher then compared these findings with the MHC Model to answer the 
second research question. With respect to the pre-determined codes, the findings 
produced three categories: a) “highly consistent”, where the data obtained from 
interviews and observations aligned with the indicator to a great extent; b) “weakly 
consistent”, where the data conflicted with the indicator to some or great extent; and c) 
“indeterminate”, where a lack of concurrence in the data prevented either designation. 
The analysis also generated two original indicators as to how the court applies these 
principles, including: “consistency and continuity” and “experience with PMI”. These 
findings are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Findings Compared to the MHC Model 
Principle Highly 
Consistent 
Weakly 
Consistent 
Indeterminate New indicators 
     
Rehabilitation & 
reintegration 
 ▪ Consideration 
of mitigating 
factors  
▪ Balancing 
rights with needs 
 
  ▪ Link to 
community 
resources 
  
   ▪Monitored 
compliance 
  
     
Rules & 
procedures 
▪ Voluntary 
nature of court 
 ▪ Teamwork ▪ Consistency & 
continuity 
 ▪ Including the 
accused 
 ▪ Including 
supports 
 
 ▪ Assistance 
throughout the 
court process 
 ▪ Relaxed 
courtroom 
atmosphere 
 
     
Interactions ▪ Verbal/non-
verbal 
communication 
  ▪ Experience 
with PMI 
 ▪ Quality of 
interpersonal 
roles 
   
     
 
 Results from this analysis ultimately revealed whether the court’s application of 
each principle reflects the MHC Model. Where the majority of indicators pertaining to a 
principle were highly consistent, the researcher concluded that the court’s application of 
the principle reflects the MHC Model. Conversely, where the majority of indicators 
pertaining to the principle were weakly or not consistent, the researcher concluded that, 
in relation to the principle, the court does not reflect the MHC Model.32 Each principle is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32   Of note, this categorization system was inspirited by New Institutionalism Theory (NIT), which posits 
that institutions are governed by “formal structures”, by which “coordination is routine, rules and 
procedures are followed, and actual activities conform to the prescription of formal structure” (Meyer & 
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discussed below, followed by an examination of the original indicators “consistency and 
continuity” and “experience with PMI”.  
Principle 1: Does Not Reflect the MHC Model  
 
The first principle of the MHC Model is that therapeutic jurisprudence promotes 
supports and services that are aligned with rehabilitation and reintegration. In line with 
categorization system explained in the above section, the data suggest that the court under 
study does not reflect the MHC Model. Specifically, as presented in Table 4, the data 
were either weakly or not consistent with the associated indicators (where the data 
obtained from interviews and observations conflicted with the indicator to some extent), 
or its status was indistinguishable (where a lack of concurrence in the data prevented a 
designation of either highly or weakly consistent).  
There are a number of factors that can assist in explaining the weakly consistent 
indicators. Specifically, respondents emphasized that the MHC under study is 
substantially impeded by a lack of funding and resources. This structural and externally 
imposed reality has a cascading effect on the coupling of the remaining indicators, all of 
which require and flow from the availability of community resources. For example, a rich 
array of community supports and resources is a necessary condition for the court to 
utilize diversion in place of traditional sentencing. In the former, participants do not enter 
a plea, whereas in the latter, they must enter a guilty plea, resulting in a qualitatively 
different experience at the very beginning. Without adequate community resources, the 
court under study was impeded in its ability to use diversion, and had little choice but to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
& Rowan, 1977, p. 342). As institutions evolve, expansion often occurs in the form of lower levels or 
sub-units, referred to as organizations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). NIT inquires as to whether formal 
structures accurately reflect the day-to-day activities of contemporary organizations. Specifically, 
organizations can “tightly	  coupled”	  (reflect),	  or	  “loosely	  coupled”	  (not	  reflect)	  institutions.	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fall back on traditional responses to crime (such as probation). This, in turn, directly 
affected the indicator “balanced responses to crime”, where the majority of respondents 
characterized the court as punitive, suggesting that it does not place priority on 
addressing individuals’ disorders and associated needs to the extent needed.  
However, this characterization is best interpreted as one of degree rather than 
kind, and does not imply that the court fails completely to balance its responses to crime. 
In this regard, several respondents outlined alternative to diversion that the court adopts 
to balance dispositions. For example, the court would routinely adjourn proceedings to 
grant participants the opportunity to become engaged in treatment programs and support 
services. To some extent, this alterative mirrors the diversion option by granting 
participants opportunities to address their underlying disorders and circumstances. 
Although they are not diverted from the need to enter a plea, participants are afforded the 
time to better situate themselves for sentencing. Thus, despite being impeded from 
applying the indicator as described in the MHC Model, the court nonetheless achieves a 
reasonable work-around within the constraints it faces. 
This shortcoming further affected the degree to which the remaining indicators 
were consistent with the literature. For example, the literature described “monitored 
compliance” strictly in the context of presumed diversion, and did not contemplate 
circumstances where diversion was not possible. Accordingly, the court under study was 
unable to monitor compliance in the manner and to the extent contemplated in the 
literature, and the data from respondents were judged to be weakly consistent in relation 
to this indicator.  
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However, despite this apparent shortcoming, respondents did identify two 
innovative ways in which the court monitors participants: a) granting a series of 
adjournments that allow accused persons to improve their circumstances prior to 
sentencing; and b) frequently relying on probation as a disposition. In the former, at each 
scheduled return date, the court officers learn the details of the participant’s progress or 
lack thereof, and are able to align the disposition with these efforts. In the latter, 
participants are monitored by probation officers under specific terms and conditions, and 
the court can conclude that an absence of reports documenting breaches suggests a degree 
of success (reflected as the “no news is good news” criterion). Thus, similar to the 
previous indicator, the court works around the impediments it faces to achieve a degree 
of monitoring in ways that reflect its constraints and resources. In so doing, it may not 
attain the ideal, but neither can it be considered a failure to monitor compliance.  
Further, within a diversion perspective, the literature states that MHCs “consider 
mitigating factors” in designing effective alternatives to punishment. Once again, the 
presumption of a required array of community resources resulted in the data being 
weakly consistent with this indicator. In this regard, the court under study does endeavour 
to consider such factors for dispositions outside of diversion. For example, it will 
consider issues pertaining to housing and substance abuse, and align them with 
appropriate responses to the extent possible. However, as reported by most respondents, 
such attempts are significantly impeded by the lack of resources, as are the prospects of 
rehabilitation and reintegration.   
Thus, with respect to this principle, the MHC Model posits an “ideal” that fails to 
contemplate the specific demands and impediments faced by the court under study. 
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Unaligned with the assumption of available resources and diversion as the primary 
disposition, it logically follows that the associated indicators will be weakly consistent. 
However, this is not to say that the court fails to apply this principle to any extent. Rather, 
the findings demonstrate that the court’s application of this principle reflects the demands 
and obstacles it faces, and causes it to veer from the prescription of the MHC Model.  
Principle 2: Indeterminate  
 
 The second principle of the MHC Model is that therapeutic jurisprudence 
promotes therapeutic rules and procedures over those that might be considered anti-
therapeutic. In this respect, the findings prevented the researcher from determining with 
reasonable certainty whether the court under study reflects the MHC Model. As presented 
in Table 4, data pertaining to the associated indicators were either highly consistent, or 
indeterminate due to a lack of concurrence among respondents. Highly consistent 
indicators included: voluntary nature of the court, including the accused, and assistance 
throughout the court process. Indeterminate indicators included: teamwork, inclusion of 
support networks, and a relaxed courtroom.  
Highly Consistent Indicators  
 There are a number of factors that can explain the highly consistent indicators. In 
particular, these indicators were evidently more likely to include aspects of the court that 
would remain constant in the face of varying demands. Specifically, these tended to 
include foundational rules and functions, and elements that serve to increase the court’s 
legitimacy and survival. For example, with respect to the “voluntary participation” 
indicator, respondents acknowledged that the MHC is prohibited by the Criminal Code of 
Canada from coercing individuals into treatment or to take medication. Accordingly, this 
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indicator serves as a foundational component that is enforced by the law. As such, this 
would be a highly consistent element of any Canadian MHC regardless of extraneous 
demands or impediments. 
The indicators “assistance throughout the MHC” and “incorporating the accused” 
can also be described as foundational elements of the court in that they ensure its 
legitimacy and survival. MHCs developed as a response to the unfair and, arguably, 
inappropriate treatment of PMI in the criminal justice system. Each of these indicators 
address this core proposition. Specifically, failing to provide various forms of assistance 
would leave participants to navigate the criminal justice system on their own, defeating 
the purpose for which the court was established. Similarly, respondents suggested that 
inclusion of the accused in the decision-making is critical, as PMI are more likely to 
invest in goals they personally establish. Therefore, failure to include participants would 
compromise compliance with court requirements, and undermine the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the court. As such, these indicators critically differentiate the MHC from its 
traditional court counterpart and, thereby define its legitimacy and survival.  
Indeterminate  
Three indicators, “teamwork”, “inclusion of support networks”, and “relaxed 
courtroom”, were found to be indeterminate. These indicators are not necessarily 
foundational characteristics of the court as described above and, therefore, were more 
susceptible to interpretation. As a result, responses varied considerably, rendering these 
indicators indiscernible as either highly or weakly consistent. In examining the findings, 
several factors appear to have contributed to the conflicting data.  
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Foremost, responses were seemingly influenced by respondents’ roles in the 
MHC. For example, those with a greater sense of power and control over participants’ 
outcomes were more inclined to describe the MHC as a teamwork approach, and tended 
to suggest that families were involved throughout the decision making process. 
Conversely, those with less decision-making power with respect to dispositions generally 
refuted such claims, and described the MHC as an adversarial system where vested 
interests frequently conflict. Further, these respondents more commonly denied that the 
court included families throughout the decision-making process.  
Moreover, as with all qualitative studies, it is conceivable that responses were 
affected by respondents’ backgrounds and identities. For example, a few respondents 
stated that they had prior experience and training working with PMI. This characteristic 
in and of itself could potentially influence their perception on what constitutes therapeutic 
and anti-therapeutic rules and procedures when compared to someone with no prior 
experience.  
Thus, with respect to the second principle, the researcher was unable to determine 
with reasonable certainty whether the court under study reflects the MHC Model. Three 
indicators were highly consistent with the MHC Model, while three others were 
indistinguishable due to a lack of concurrence among respondents.  
Principle 3: Reflective  
 
The third principle of the MHC Model is that therapeutic jurisprudence promotes 
therapeutic interactions over those considered anti-therapeutic. In this instance, the data 
suggest that the court under study does reflect the MHC Model. In particular, the data are 
highly consistent with both of the associated indicators. Consistent with the analysis 
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under Principle 2, “therapeutic language” and “therapeutically enhanced roles” are 
indicators that would: a) likely remain constant amongst MHCs even in the face of 
extraneous demands or impediments, and b) unambiguously differentiate the MHC from 
traditional criminal courts, thereby enhancing its legitimacy and survival.  
Conceptually, these indicators merely require court actors to modify their 
language and behaviour towards PMI. In this sense, these indicators would likely be 
impervious to external conditions and impediments. The only conceivable impediment 
preventing the application of these indicators would be the actors’ unwillingness to 
modify their interactions. However, this is unlikely in a court where individuals 
voluntarily work. Beyond this, outcomes could potentially differ in MHCs in which the 
actors are involuntarily assigned to work, a possibility that might be explored by future 
studies.  
Moreover, these indicators can be described as foundational elements of the court 
in that they are central to and ensure its legitimacy and survival. As discussed, MHCs 
developed as a response to the unfair and, arguably, inappropriate treatment of PMI in the 
criminal justice system. In a similar fashion to the highly consistent indicators in the 
previous principle, these indicators address this core proposition. Both serve to create a 
more approachable and welcoming environment for PMI to participate, thereby removing 
significant barriers to success in the court. Moreover, “therapeutic language” is necessary 
to ensure participants understand their court orders and requirements. In this sense, both 
indicators serve to improve participants’ ability to succeed, and thereby enhance the 
legitimacy, and thus survival, of the court.  
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Original Indicators  
 
Finally, respondents identified two original indicators as to how the MHC applies 
the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. In relation to therapeutic interactions, 
respondents recognized the need for “experienced stakeholders”. Additionally, with 
respect to therapeutic rules and procedures, respondents identified the need for “increased 
consistency and continuity”. It is likely that these indicators would have been overlooked 
by the literature as they serve to resolve specific impediments in the court under study.  
For example, respondents revealed that the court essentially functions as an ad-hoc 
organization through the voluntary efforts of various actors and, as such, imposes no 
requirements for formal training or prior experience working with PMI. Respondents 
recognized the potential for actors to unwittingly facilitate anti-therapeutic outcomes, and 
agreed that, all else being equal, experienced actors are better able to facilitate therapeutic 
interactions with PMI. In particular, experience affords individuals with the knowledge 
and skills required to provide therapeutically beneficial treatment to PMI and, equally 
important, to avoid interactions with the potential to instill fear or anger or trigger 
outbursts. These findings suggest the need for some form of training in the MHC, which 
is further discussed in the following section under “Implications Specific to this Study”.  
 Respondents further identified the therapeutic benefit of consistency and continuity 
in the courtroom. In addition to frequent adjournments, the court under study generally 
rotates among four designated MHC judges and various individuals who serve as duty 
counsel. As a result, participants can make multiple appearances that involve a number of 
different legal actors. Respondents noted that rotation of this nature can be disorienting 
and even overwhelming in an already complex court system. As a solution, respondents 
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highlighted the court’s attempt to create a sense of consistency in spite of a rotating staff 
roster. This, in effect, allows the often-anxious participants to appear among familiar 
faces, with some indication of what to expect from each. In addition, it ensures continuity 
in the disposition, where the judge is up-to-date on the participant’s progress and can 
subsequently make informed decisions on how best to proceed.  
 In each circumstance, the newly identified indicators are solutions to issues that are 
seemingly specific to the court under study. In particular, the indicator “experienced 
actors” may not be relevant to other MHCs, where it is a given. Similarly, courts with 
designated actors may not experience difficulties arising from consistency and continuity. 
The extent to which this circumstance extends to other MHCs might be investigated in 
future research, and whether it is a common obstacle that has been overlooked by the 
literature.  
Conclusion 
 
In summary, studies to date have failed to explicitly examine how MHCs apply 
the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. Moreover, an extensive review of the 
literature failed to locate a single-sourced enumeration of these principles, which in turn, 
has constituted a barrier to the rigorous examination of how MHCs have applied the 
theory. To address these circumstances, the present study conducted an extensive review 
of the literature to extract and consolidate: a) the overarching principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and b) indicators of how each principle is applied in a MHC setting. With 
the resulting consolidation organized into a MHC Model, the study then determined how 
a MHC applies the overarching principles. Data from study respondents and observations 
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were compared with the MHC Model to establish areas of strong and weak alignment. 
The findings suggest several implications and avenues for future research 
Implications of MHC Model  
 
 The development of the MHC Model serves as an original contribution to the 
literature, and provides the first single-sourced description of the principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence and indicators of how each is applied in a MHC setting. This Model can be 
used as a template to examine how other MHCs apply these principles, and enables 
researchers to identify specific areas of stronger and weaker alignment. Addressing 
outlined weaknesses has the potential to form the basis for improving MHC functions and 
outcomes.  
Implications Specific to this MHC  
 
 The findings suggest that the court’s application of the first and second principle 
does not reflect the MHC Model. This process fostered the development of 
recommendations by which the court could attain stronger alignment with the principles. 
The court might consider adopting any or all of these recommendations in its ongoing 
efforts to improve its functioning and alignment with other courts that have achieved a 
positive impact on rehabilitation, reintegration, and recidivism. 
 With respect to the first principle, (therapeutic jurisprudence promotes supports and 
services that are aligned with rehabilitation and reintegration), the court is well advised to 
consider advocating at the local or provincial levels for a greater investment in 
community resources dedicated to PMI. Success in this regard would allow the court to 
utilize diversion as its primary disposition and strengthen the degree of consistency 
amongst the indicators that rest on its application. Of particular note, there is a critical 
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need for advocacy to address the housing needs of PMI who come in contact with the 
law. Both prior research and study respondents noted that, until housing needs are 
addressed, other endeavours aimed at rehabilitation are essentially futile. Thus, advocacy 
for increased services and supports would serve to strengthen the court’s alignment with 
the first principle which, in turn, holds strong potential to improve outcomes. 
 With respect to the second principle, (therapeutic jurisprudence promotes 
therapeutic rules and procedures over those that might be considered anti-therapeutic) the 
findings suggest a lack of clarity and understanding regarding certain aspects of the court. 
Of note, the majority of respondents were unable to define therapeutic jurisprudence, the 
construct on which the court is founded. Findings of this nature suggest the need for 
training and/or program development initiatives within the court to enhance levels of 
common understanding. For example, in addressing the indeterminate factors, training 
could: a) provide strategies to practice and improve teamwork; b) outline and discuss the 
benefits of including support systems throughout the decision-making process; and c) 
speak to the need for leniency with respect to rules and regulations within the courtroom. 
The findings suggest that it would be to the court’s advantage to provide such training in 
order to address the outlined constraints. Moreover, general education to address the 
nature of the therapeutic jurisprudence approach might further enhance conceptual and 
functional consensus about how the court functions. This could be further beneficial to 
other MHCs. 
Future Research   
 
First, the findings of this study suggest that the MHC literature does not 
contemplate the possibility of factors that impede or prevent the application of 
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therapeutic jurisprudence in MHCs. Examination of the court under study makes a strong 
case for future research to consider and legitimize alternatives as to how MHCs might 
apply the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence in less than ideal circumstances. As a 
start, future research might study options for applying therapeutic jurisprudence in courts 
that are impeded by a lack of funding and resources. Broadening the perspective in this 
manner would recognize the realities faced by some courts, and legitimize their efforts to 
accommodate these realities. Of particular interest would be studies to assess recidivism 
rates attained by MHCs under less than ideal circumstances (i.e. those that are weakly 
consistent with the MHC Model as in the present case).  
 Second, prior research assumes the consistent application of therapeutic 
jurisprudence among MHCs. As a result, specific findings from such studies tend to be 
generalized to most or all MHCs. The present study undermines the validity of such 
generalizations. However, even when MHCs have the requisite services and supports, 
they are likely to vary in ways that, for the most part, remain unrecognized or unreported. 
This suggests that comparability among MHCs is difficult. To address this situation, a 
comparative examination of MHCs is needed in order to define and understand a 
continuum to reflect common variations. Studies of this nature might use the MHC 
Model established in this study, and draw from its methods. Comparative benchmarking 
in this manner would ultimately permit studies to generalize findings between similarly 
aligned MHCs.  
 Further, such research might examine the extent to which MHCs, across the 
continuum, utilize diversion. In particular, a comparison of this nature could determine 
whether greater alignment with the principles and associated indicators does in fact 
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enhance a MHC’s use of diversion. Such investigations would identify the constraints 
that impinge on the use diversion, and would form the basis for developing evidence-
based strategies to increase its use.  
As a final consideration, with the exception of critical criminological scholarship, 
prior research tends to assume that therapeutic jurisprudence is unequivocally beneficial 
to defendants, and is a less punitive intervention than traditional courts. However, a 
growing body of literature challenges this assertion and questions the benefit of 
“therapeutic alternatives”. In particular, these studies suggest that seemingly therapeutic 
aspects of specialized courts can, in fact, substitute equally punitive measures33. 
For example34, certain specialized courts in Ontario have been found to prolong 
the duration of bail, thereby allowing defendants time to complete court-mandated 
treatment. 35 This is “therapeutically justified”, as it affords defendants the opportunity to 
complete specific programs to address their identified needs. However, these critiques 
question the benefits of court-mandated treatment, suggesting it can involve the 
introduction of additional punitive outcomes36 and the imposition of more criminal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  It is noteworthy that Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto (2012) acknowledge punitive consequences to be 
inadvertent consequences of therapeutic practices. Alternatively, Moore (2007) suggests that 
punishment is disguised by therapeutic terminology. 
34   As a specific example of these arguments, Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto (2012) examined Ontario’s 
Early Intervention Domestic Violence Court, which requires offenders to complete a Partner Abuse 
Response Services (PARS) counselling program as a condition of bail. This entails 16 weeks of 
counselling, where participants learn non-violent alternatives for dealing with anger. Despite its 
therapeutic intentions, many female partners were required to participate as a result of Ontario’s dual 
charge policy (where police avoid arbitrating disputes and, instead, criminally charge both parties). 
Further, women had difficulty accessing counselling programs due to limited spaces, resulting in 
extended periods of bail supervision and even longer sentencing delays.  
35   For example, Hannah-Moffat and Maurotto (2012) note that both Drug Treatment Courts and Early 
Intervention Domestic Violence Courts in Ontario commonly prolong bail for their associated treatment 
programs. Both are identified as specialized courts that are guided by therapeutic jurisprudence.  
36  Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto (2012) suggest: “When access to treatment and social service resources is 
mandated by courts, new punishment strategies arise. Preventative therapeutic measures are combined 
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charges if compliance is not achieved37. In so doing, such practices appear to conflict 
with section 720 of the Criminal Code of Canada, which requires sentencing as soon as 
possible after conviction (Hannah-Moffat & Maurutto, 2012).38  
Although included among specialized courts, MHCs in general have not been 
subjected to similar critical analysis, and whether the noted problems apply has yet to be 
determined. This suggests the need for additional research to examine whether MHCs 
introduce additional punitive measures in similar fashion. 
Further, as a case study, the findings of this research are limited to the observed 
court, and might theoretically contribute to this growing body of critical literature. In 
particular, due to the lack of adequate community resources, the MHC was impeded in its 
ability to employ diversion, and had little choice but to fall back on traditional responses 
such as probation. As a result, the majority of study respondents portrayed the MHC as 
overly punitive, suggesting that it fails to address individuals’ underlying disorders and 
associated needs to the extent it should. Including MHCs in these critiques of specialized 
courts would require further research to determine whether these findings are more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with, and enforced through, a range of punitive conditions—preventative therapeutic practices have not 
eroded punishment, instead they are reassembled and repackaged” (p. 206). For example, an offender’s 
access to services and treatment may coincide with the imposition of a range of more intrusive and 
disciplinary conditions that ensure and regulate their attendance and compliance. The authors indicate 
that defendants in Drug Treatment Court may receive as many as 40 conditions over their extended bail 
period. 
37  For example, breaches in Ontario Drug Treatment Courts are at times punished with short stints in 
custody and additional sanctions, such as a requirement to do community service hours (Hannah-Moffat 
& Maurutto, 2012).  
38  In a traditional bail court, cases are processed as quickly as possible and treatment is not typically 
mandated prior to sentencing. Conversely, in certain specialized courts, bail is extended, sometimes for 
as long as two years, to enable offenders to complete treatment programs prior to sentencing (Hannah-
Moffat & Maurutto, 2012).  	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widespread. Should they exist on a larger scale, future research should consider whether 
MHCs, in less than ideal circumstances, are in fact less punitive than traditional courts.   
Concluding Statements  
 
MHCs are relatively new developments, and require ongoing research for 
improvement. This study contributes to this growing body of research in two respects. 
First, it establishes a clearer understanding of what is meant by “therapeutic 
jurisprudence” by consolidating its overarching principles and the indicators for each. 
Second, it sheds light on the reality that MHCs may face limitations beyond their control 
that prevent the application of therapeutic jurisprudence in line with the ideal reflected in 
the literature.  
Nonetheless, the present study should in no way be considered a negative critique 
of the examined MHC. It is crucial to appreciate that the court was established by a 
handful of volunteers with little to no financial support and an inadequate range of 
community services and supports. It was driven by an idea of what was right for the PMI 
it encountered, and a commitment to do the best possible. As such, it is of central 
importance to acknowledge the efforts and dedication of the stakeholders despite the 
challenges and impediments they face daily. Without this court, PMI would be processed 
in the traditional court system, which is unable to accommodate or address their needs. 
Should the court under study consider adopting the proposed recommendations, it has the 
potential to improve its alignment with therapeutic jurisprudence.  
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Appendix A 
     Interview Schedule 
 
With your permission, I’m going to begin recording our conversation now (wait for 
response to begin recording). I am going to now ask you a series of questions regarding 
the Mental Health Court. Please be assured (as you read in the information letter) that 
your identifying information will be separated from your responses here to protect your 
privacy. At times, I will also ask you about historical or current experiences or examples 
you have. I will be doing this to make the concepts more tangible. Please know that I will 
also treat these examples and any groups or individuals identified confidentially, and that 
all identifying information will be removed. Feel free to skip questions and also to return 
to any question at any time during the interview if you have more you would like to add. 
Do you have any questions before we begin?   
 
Introductory Questions:  
1) What is your affiliation with the Mental Health Court?  
2) How long have you been affiliated with the Mental Health Court? 
3) The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence is often associated with Mental Health 
Courts. What is your understanding of this concept? 
 
R1: How does Mental Health Court promote therapeutic solutions?  
 
 Q1: In your opinion, what is the overall goal of the Mental Health Court? 
  
Q2: How does this goal differ from that of the traditional court?   
 
Q3: What are some of dispositions arrived at in mental health court? 
o How does these compare to traditional courts? 
 
Q4: What is considered in formulating these dispositions? 
 
Q5: What are some of the programs Mental Health Court participants attend? 
• Who runs the programs? 
• How does the court encourage compliance? 
 
R2: How does Mental Health Court apply therapeutic rules and procedures? 
 
Q6: Which specific rules and procedures found in traditional courts might be 
considered anti-therapeutic?  
 
Q7: How do the rules and procedures differ from traditional criminal courts?  
 
Q8: Who is consulted in constructing an appropriate plan for each Mental Health 
Court participant?  
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Q9: How does the Mental Health Court expedite the development of a plan?   
 
Q10: How is the participant incorporated into the development of a plan?  
 
R3: How does Mental Health Court facilitate therapeutic interactions?  
 
Q11: How do you facilitate positive interaction with Mental Health Court 
participants?  
 
Q12: What would you consider to be anti-therapeutic when interacting with a 
participant of the Mental Health Court? How is this avoided?  
 
Q13: How would you describe your role in a Mental Health Court?  
 
Q14: What type of language is used when interacting with Mental Health  
Court participants?  
• What type of language is avoided?  
Concluding Question:  
 
Q15: Overall, what do you think works well in Mental Health Court? What 
doesn’t?  
Conclusion:  
1) Is there anything else you would like to add that my questions haven’t addressed?  
(Wait to make sure the participant has no further questions or comments). At this point, I 
would like to sincerely thank you for taking the time to talk to me today. If you would 
like, when this study is complete, I would be happy to provide you with a copy of the 
literature review and a summary of findings. If you would like a copy of these findings, 
or if you have any questions about the study, please contact me at the email address listed 
on your information letter. I would like to reassure you that all the information you have 
provided will be kept completely confidential. Your name or any other personal 
identifying information will not appear in any documents resulting from this study. Do 
you have any questions? (Wait for response.) Thank you again for your participation.  	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Appendix B 
Recruitment Letter 
 
 
Hello (participant’s name will be inserted), 
 
 
My name is Anne Simpson and I am a Master’s student in the Department of Sociology 
and Legal Studies at the University of Waterloo. I am conducting research under the 
supervision of Dr. Jennifer Schulenberg on the theoretical underpinnings of the Mental 
Health Court. This study seeks to examine how the Mental Health Court applies the 
principles of therapeutic jurisprudence. I would appreciate the opportunity to speak with 
you given your association with, and knowledge regarding, the Mental Health Court.  
Participation in this study involves one interview of approximately 45-60 minutes. Your 
involvement in this study is entirely voluntary and you may decline to answer any 
questions without penalty. All information you provide will be considered confidential. 
This study has been reviewed by and received ethics clearance through a University of 
Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. However, the final decision about participation is 
yours.  
 
Attached, you will find an information letter with further details on the project. If you are 
interested in participating, please contact me at amsimpso@uwaterloo.ca, or by telephone 
at (519) 827-5548 and we will arrange a day, time and location convenient for you during 
which we can conduct the interview.   
 
Thank you in advance for your interest in this project.    
Sincerely, 
  
 
Anne Simpson  	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Appendix C 
Letter of Information  
 
Dear (participant’s name will be inserted): 
 
 
This letter is an invitation to participate in a study I am conducting in part of my Master’s 
degree in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the University of Waterloo 
under the supervision of Dr. Jennifer Schulenberg. I would like to provide you with more 
information about this project and what your involvement would entail if you decide to 
participate. 
 
The first part of the study consolidates the literature into a set of key principles and 
indicators of “therapeutic jurisprudence”. From this exercise, I have developed a set of 
questions for the second part of this study. In part two, I will be interviewing people who 
are directly involved with the Mental Health Court, and will ask about their perceptions 
of how therapeutic jurisprudence is applied by the court. The questions do not test your 
knowledge of therapeutic jurisprudence theory, but rather, asks about the procedures and 
operations in which you are currently involved.  
 
The study will contribute to theoretical knowledge about therapeutic jurisprudence, and 
how it is applied in practice. Your participation will assist in generating an original 
contribution to the literature, as this is the first study to examine how the principles of 
therapeutic jurisprudence have been applied by a Mental Health Court. Moreover, it 
opens the door to future studies using the same methodology to compare multiple courts, 
and has the potential to help refine their effectiveness over time.  
 
Participation in this study is voluntary. Your decision to participate or not, will not be 
shared with other members of the Mental Health Court or other participants in the study. 
It will involve one interview of approximately 45-60 minutes. You may decline to answer 
any of the interview questions if you so wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from 
this study at any time by advising the student investigator. With your permission, the 
interview will be audio-recorded to facilitate data collection and later transcription for 
analysis. All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name 
or any other personal identifying information will not appear in the thesis resulting from 
this study; however, with your permission, anonymous quotations may be used. While 
your identity will remain confidential, given that the court will be referred to as a 'Mental 
Health Court in Southwestern Ontario', it is possible that a motivated individual may 
infer your identity. Notes and audio recordings collected during this study will be 
retained for a period of one year after study completion in a locked filing cabinet in my 
supervisor’s on-campus office. Electronic data will be stored on a password protected 
computer and an encrypted USB drive. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as 
a participant in this study. 
 
If you have any questions regarding this study, or would like additional information to 
assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please contact me by email at 
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amsimpso@uwaterloo.ca, or by telephone at (519) 827-5548. You can also contact my 
supervisor, Dr. Jennifer Schulenberg by telephone at (519) 888-4567, ext. 38639 or by 
email at jlschule@uwaterloo.ca. If you would like a copy of the final thesis, please 
indicate this request to the researcher, Anne Simpson, through the provided contact 
information.   
 
This project has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through a University of 
Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. However, the final decision about participation is 
yours. Participants who have concerns or questions about their involvement in the project 
may contact the Chief Ethics Officer, Office of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567, Ext. 
36005 or maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca.  
 
I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations directly 
involved in the study, other voluntary recreation organizations not directly involved in 
the study, as well as to the broader research community. 
 
I very much look forward to speaking with you and thank you in advance for your 
assistance in this project. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Anne Simpson  	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Appendix D 
Consent of Participation 
 
By signing this consent form, you are not waiving your legal rights or releasing the 
investigator(s) or involved institution(s) from their legal and professional responsibilities.  
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being 
conducted by Anne Simpson of the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at the 
University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask any questions related to this 
study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any additional details I 
wanted. I am aware that I may withdraw from the study without penalty at any time by 
advising the researchers of this decision.   
 
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through a University of 
Waterloo Research Ethics Committee.  I was informed that if I have any comments or 
concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact the Director, Office 
of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567 ext. 36005.  
 
I agree to be audio recorded for transcription and analysis purposes: Y/N 
 
I agree to the use of quotations in the thesis and papers which emerge from this study: 
Y/N 
 
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this 
study.   
________________________________________ 
Print Name 
  
________________________________________ 
Signature of Participant 
 
________________________________________ 
Dated at the Waterloo Court House, Ontario 
 
________________________________________ 
Witnessed  	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Appendix E 
     Feedback Letter  
 
Dear (participant’s name will be inserted), 
 
I would like to thank you for your participation in this study entitled “Examining the 
Application of the Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in a Mental Health Court”. As 
a reminder, the purpose of this study was to establish a consolidation of the literature to 
date, which included the overarching principles of therapeutic jurisprudence as well as 
the ways it could be applied in a Mental Health Court. Further, this study sought to 
examine how the Mental Health Court applies the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence.  
 
The first part of the study consolidated the literature into a set of key principles and 
indicators of “therapeutic jurisprudence”. From this exercise, I developed a set of 
questions for the second part of this study. In part two, I interviewed people who are 
directly involved with the Mental Health Court, and asked about their perceptions of how 
therapeutic jurisprudence is applied by the court. The questions did not test your 
knowledge of therapeutic jurisprudence theory, but rather, asked about the procedures 
and operations in which you are currently involved.  
 
The study contributes to theoretical knowledge about therapeutic jurisprudence, and how 
it is applied in practice. Your participation assisted in generating an original contribution 
to the literature, as this is the first study to examine how the principles of therapeutic 
jurisprudence have been applied by a Mental Health Court. Moreover, it opens the door 
to future studies using the same methodology to compare multiple courts, and has the 
potential to help refine their effectiveness over time.  
 
Please remember that any data pertaining to you as an individual participant will be kept 
confidential. Once all the data are collected and analyzed for this project, I plan on 
sharing this information with the research community through seminars, conferences, 
presentations, and journal articles. If you are interested in receiving more information 
regarding the results of this study, or would like a summary of the results, please provide 
your email address, and when the study is completed (anticipated by September 2015) I 
will send you the information. In the meantime, if you have any questions about the 
study, please do not hesitate to contact me by the email address noted below. Alternately, 
you may contact my supervisor, Dr. Jennifer Schulenberg at jlschule@uwaterloo.ca, or 
by telephone at (519) 888-4567, ext. 38639. As with all University of Waterloo projects 
involving human participants, this project has been reviewed and received ethics 
clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. Participants who 
have concerns or questions about their involvement in the project may contact the Chief 
Ethics Officer, Office of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or 
maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca.  
 
I hope that the results of my study will be of benefit to those organizations directly 
involved in the study, other voluntary recreation organizations not directly involved in 
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the study, as well as to the broader research community. If indicated, a copy of the final 
thesis will be sent to you upon completion through your outlined method of contact. 
 
Thank you for your assistance in this project. 
Sincerely,  
 
Anne Simpson 
 
 
University of Waterloo 
Master’s Candidate 
Department of Sociology 
(51) 827-5548 
amsimpso@uwaterloo.ca 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
